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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 6, June 1990

# Soviet Union

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[Selected translations from the Russian-language monthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 6, Jun 90

### A Half-Century of Silence (The 1937 All-Union Population Census)

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[Article by Yuriy Aleksandrovich Polyakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of historical sciences and advisor to the Directorate of the USSR History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Scientific Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences on Historical Demography and Historical Geography; Valentina Borisovna Zhiromskaya, candidate of historical sciences and senior science associate at the USSR History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Igor Nikolayevich Kiselev, candidate of historical sciences and science associate at the USSR History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The fates of the Soviet population censuses have developed differently. It has been fortunate for some that multivolume publications on the results can be found crowded on the bookshelves of libraries; for others it has been less fortunate with their data humbly confined to a single volume. But there are truly tragic pages in the history of the Soviet censuses. And one of them is the 1937 All-Union Population Census.... Immediately after the completing of the totals, its data were declared defective and certain organizers were repressed. A half-century of silence gave rise to many legends, when entire generations of Soviet people have not even heard about the very fact of its holding and researchers could only guess at its results [1].

Over many years, historians, sociologists and demographers have endeavored to find its materials. Until recently the scientists were not even certain that the census had survived. Some felt that the materials had been burned up and others that it was languishing in the basements of the repositories while others were hopeful that perhaps even individual indicators had survived.

At the same time, the census data were essential for studying Soviet society in the 1930s, its social and national composition, the demographic processes, for determining the scope of the Stalinist repressions, for calculating the actual losses of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and for investigating the consequences of collectivization and the famine at the beginning of the 1930s.

Only in recent years has the silence surrounding the census been broken, and at the end of the 1980s the doubts as to the validity of the assessment given it were openly voiced and the question posed of its rehabilitation. However, the publications which appeared concerned only certain questions of its organization while

out of the total diversity of the range of indicators there was only one: the total size of the USSR population [2]. The main thing that was known was that the basic materials from the census were kept in the Central State Archives of the USSR National Economy (TsGANKh) [3], and now we have obtained an opportunity to make the basic bulk of its data for all the surviving indicators available to the scholarly community.

The 1937 All-Union Census was carried out as a single-day census. Its critical date was the night of 5-6 January. This was the only single-day census and such an attempt was never repeated.

The dates for conducting it were repeatedly shifted. It is felt that initially it was set for 1932 (for the results of the First Five-Year Plan) and then moved to 1935 [4], and finally was held in 1937. As is known, in September 1932, an experimental census was conducted in the town of Tula as well as in Bobrikovskiy, Volokolamskiy, Yelatskiy and Tolskiy Rayons of Moscow Oblast. The experience of organizing this was used in preparing for the 1937 Census, and in particular for drawing up the "Dictionary of Occupations" [5].

Undoubtedly, it was planned for 1936, for the layouts of the census sheets were headed: "1936 All-Union Population Census" [6].

The basic task of the census was to count only the population present in the city and countryside in contrast to the 1926 Census which covered also the permanent population in the cities, and 1939, when both the present and permanent population were counted in the cities and villages. Since the 1937 Census was single-day, some 1,250,000 census takers were employed in carrying it out. The Central Administration for National Economic Accounting (TsUNKhU) provided each census sheet with a memorandum for the census taker and this demanded that they cross off those who were not spending the night at their place of residence during the night of 5-6 January, that is, on the critical date of the census. The demand was linked to the specific features of a one-day census and was made in order that those not spending the night at home would not be recounted in another place, but this was not always carried out in practice and could not help but lead to certain mistakes and losses in the census count. This was subsequently held against the organizers of the census. However, such mistakes and inaccuracies, losses in the population count are characteristic of any census and cannot be used as grounds for canceling the results.

As a whole, the census was prepared carefully and over an extended time. The Census Bureau was headed by O.A. Kvitkin, previously a county statistician who had been directly involved in organizing the 1926 Census and was an experienced theorist and practical worker. At that time I.A. Kraval, the well-known statistician and

economist, was the head of the TsUNKhU. The instructions for carrying out the 1937 Census had been worked out carefully under his leadership. Both were executed in 1938-1939.

From April 1936, active preparations got underway for the census. A special Appeal of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] to the Public was adopted and this explained the national economic significance of the census and stated that it was the duty of each person to participate in the census. Brochures were published in mass runs, lectures were given, talks were held with the public and slogans proclaimed.

However, the preparatory work had to be carried out under the difficult situation of the cult of personality. The press announced that the census was being conducted according to Stalin's initiative and with the direct participation of the leader in preparing its program. We will see later just what the consequences of his involvement would be.

In violating the scientific principles for organizing a census, the press set out to predict its results ahead of time. It was expected that the results would show "rapid growth," "grandiose shifts" and "exceptional successes" in "our fine today." One of the main indicators for these successes was considered to be the "rapid growth" in the size of the population. An editorial in the newspaper PRAVDA stated that our motherland "is producing an increase in the population that is much larger than the capitalist nations" [7]. Certainly the results of the census should exceed the estimated size of the population of 168 million persons at the end of 1933 mentioned by Stalin at the 17th VKP(b) Congress. It was accepted that it would rise even more and reach, according to the forecast then existing in the TsUNKhU and worked out on the basis of the 1926 Census and the estimates for the annual increase in the population based on the current demographic counting of 180.3 million persons [8]. In the forecast there was the corresponding erroneous idea that with a rise in the standard of living (and it was felt that in the 1930s this rose sharply) the size of the population would increase automatically. This was seen as one of the main advantages of socialism over capitalism. The hypothesis of the automatic increase in the population was turned into an official idea. However, the forecast, as we will see, was not to be realized.

Initially, it was assumed that the census would encompass a broad range of questions including sex, age, nationality, mother tongue, literacy and education. The respondent was asked: in what language he was able to write and speak; was he able to both write and read or merely read. It was important that the nationality and mother tongue were set by the self-definition of the respondent. More than in the other censuses here attention was to be paid to education. Initially, the census list did not contain a direct question as to what social group the respondent belonged but rather there existed the

question of employment which was traditional for the Soviet censuses. The question was introduced of family status and the length of time the person had been married.

The final version of the sheet edited by Stalin was significantly impoverished in comparison with the draft. In particular, any clarifications disappeared on the question of literacy. To the question of whether the respondent was married, there was only to be a monosyllabic answer: yes or no. The question of ancillary employment and sources of income was eliminated. On the other hand, upon Stalin's initiative, the question appeared about religion (5), as well as the question of belonging to a social group (14), where the choice of the following groups was offered: worker, white-collar personnel, kolkhoz member, individual peasant, artisan, persons in the free professions as well as priests and nonworking elements. The question was introduced of citizenship (7). Clearly, this was done in line with the adoption of a USSR Constitution in 1936.

The census organizers, as they were able, salvaged their program and defended a rather broad range of questions (see the census sheet) [not reproduced]. Even, for example, on the lame question of social group, all the same the list of groups was significantly broader than had been heard in the leader's speeches and who felt that all social strata had been obliterated from the face of the Soviet earth, with the exception of workers, kolkhoz members, white-collar personnel and intelligentsia. Particularly valuable was the fact that the census organizers had been able to keep the question of the employment of the population with the aid of which it was possible to monitor the view of the respondent concerning his belonging to one or another social group.

But for completely understandable reasons the compilers of the program were unable to completely free themselves of the influence of the situation of those times. One is struck by the fact that priests were put in the same group as nonworking persons while in the censuses of the 1920s, they were correctly considered as persons of the free professions, that is, among the intelligentsia not employed in state service. Disappearing from the list of occupations was "small independent farmer" and the insulting "individual peasant" appeared. The incorporation of questions concerning religion and the belonging to a social group ran counter to the classic demands of statistics. In a textbook for the workers of statistical bodies [9], N.Ya. Vorobyev had cautioned that such questions could merely serve to obtain a distorted answer far from the truth.

N.Ya. Vorobyev turned out to be right. Here the census as a whole was carried out properly, with a conscientious attitude by the public, but all three questions concerning religion, social group and citizenship caused extreme irritation and even here among a certain portion of the public. In many regions of the nation, including Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Kiev, Sverdlovsk, Moscow Oblast and elsewhere, rumors spread that



believers would be "burdened down with taxes," and that those who admitted being believers "should be picked up," and that all the nonbelievers would be "burned out by the fascists and there would soon be a war" and "the believers were being expelled from the area and the children were being removed from school." To question 7 "citizen of which state?" there were answers such as: "citizen of the Russian state," "anti-Soviet element," "only not Soviet." There were also rumors that if one wrote down individual peasant, then you would be "exiled," and certain kolkhoz members rushed to submit a request to withdraw from the kolkhoz as "if they take the census on the kolkhoz, you will remain there forever and it is better to leave and die." In certain regions, the individual peasants closed their huts and did not allow in the census takers. In Mstislavskiy Rayon of Belorussia, an individual peasant refused the census and four times did not allow the census takers in the house. "When they arrived at his house, it was locked. They broke in a window and found five individual peasants hiding there." The owner of the house was arrested and the remainder agreed to the count [10].

Regardless of all the complications in carrying out the census and the difficult situation in which it was done, it was carried out, as I.A. Kraval felt shortly thereafter (25 January 1937) successfully, with a rather high accuracy and without any substantial misses of the population. This was confirmed by the control counts upon the completion of the census [11].

Judging from the severe retribution against the census and its leaders, the government did not expect to obtain such an objective picture which disclosed the actual state of affairs both in the number of the population, the level of literacy and education, in the degree of the spread of atheism and so forth. Just what were the results which so frightened the then leadership of the nation?

On 24 January 1937, I.A. Kraval informed Stalin and Molotov of the first result of the census: without the population counted by the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] and the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] (that is, without the special contingent of the NKVD and the Army) and minus passengers on trains and steamship boats, there were 156 million persons [12].

The chief of the TsUNKhU was probably certain of this figure when he sent out a telegram to the localities in which he ordered the carrying out of control counts as well as the taking of other measures to clarify the results [13].

After the telegraph announcements to the TsUNKhU, reports began to be received on carrying out the census. The materials stored in the archives show that the results on the spot did not cause any doubt. Thus, Yegorov, the chief of the Sverdlovsk Oblast UNKhU [Administration of National Economic Reporting] in his note of 17 January commented that "mistakes were made both toward an understating and overstating of the data" [14].

But the control counts raised the total number by 0.27 percent [15]. The chief of the Belorussian UNKhU, Vladimirskiy, on 3 February concluded his report with the words: "...The population census was carried out successfully in Belorussia and with a full coverage of the population" [16]. An unusually detailed note was sent in to the TsUNKhU by the rayon census agent in Kuntsevskiy Rayon of Moscow, V.D. Gogol. Having begun with the assertion that "in checking on the execution of the census not a single uncounted citizen was discovered in my rayon," on page 17 he concluded: "...The result of the census clearly confirms to us even now, before the elaboration of the materials, that guided by our Great Leader Stalin, our motherland and the peoples inhabiting it have moved forward far along the path to communism." Appended to the report was a statement on verifying the accuracy of delimiting the census object between the camp (Dmitlag) and the houses of Kuntsevskiy Rayon adjacent to the camp structures. Among the signatures, the first were the signatures of V.D. Gogol and the Chief of the 3d Division of Karamyshevskiy Rayon of the NKVD Dmitlag, the State Security Lt I.B. Maklyarskiy [17].

In a report to Kraval from the Chief of the Chelyabinsk Oblast UNKhU, Stokovskiy, dispatched on 23 January, although the gap in the census data with the previous calculations is noted, this circumstance did not cause any concern, for a repeated test showed the good quality of the conducted census, and in particular the test and the "rural localities excludes the possibility of undercounting or missing the population in the census" [18].

For Sverdlovsk Oblast, the UNKhU Chief Bobrov informed the TsUNKhU that "the complete coverage of the population by the census and the accuracy of the census data have been verified by several methods" and the overall result of all the tests convincingly shows that the All-Union Population Census for Sverdlovsk Oblast has fully covered the population "with the exception of limited instances" [19].

It was precisely the certainty as to the validity of the obtained materials which, in our view, forced the Chief of the Ukrainian UNKhU Kustolyan in a note sent to Kraval on 10 January to comment that "the census results for the Ukraine, judging from the preliminary data, make this material top secret" [20]. In mid-March, I.A. Kraval forwarded a report to the Central Committee and the SNK.

[Start of Report]

To the Secretary of the  
VKP(b) Central Committee,  
Comrade I.V. Stalin

To the Chairman of the USSR SNK,  
Comrade V.M. Molotov

# ON PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE ALL-UNION POPULATION CENSUS

On the basis of the decrees of the USSR SNK of 28 and 29 April 1936, the TsUNKhU of the USSR Gosplan on 6 January 1937 conducted an All-Union Population Census.

Due to the fact that at present the date is due for submitting the preliminary results of the population census as set by the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK and the work of the group of Comrade Yakovlev is not yet complete, the TsUNKhU is submitted the results in the form which they exist at present.

The census was conducted in precise accord with the instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK [...].

The materials available to the TsUNKhU show that the census was conducted on a high political level, as a major statewide and general party undertaking with the exceptional activeness of the broad masses of the population. The Appeal of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK played an enormous role in successfully conducting the census. The party and soviet bodies directly and with exceptional attention were engaged in preparing and conducting the census, in recruiting personnel, carrying out mass explanatory work among the population and ensuring all the necessary material and organizational conditions for the census.

The active work of the party and soviet bodies ensured the completely satisfactory make-up of census cadres [...].

In preparing for the census we encountered very active attempts by the class enemy elements to obstruct its holding by disseminating false rumors, particularly on the question of religion. A number of facts, for example, the organized refusal by almost 200 persons to provide information about themselves which occurred in the Lepelskiy Okrug of Russia has shown that in some places not individuals are at work but rather counterrevolutionary organizations which have endeavored to undermine the census. The extensive explanatory work carried out everywhere has paralyzed the attempts of the class enemy elements and has caused great activeness among the public which in every possible way has aided in successfully carrying out the census.

The carefulness of the preparatory work which was done significantly better than in the previous 1926 Census, the active involvement of the party and Soviet bodies and the exceptionally conscientious attitude toward the census by the public aided in the complete count of the population.

After conducting control counts which were provided by the census organizational plan in order to verify again whether there had been omissions of the public committed in individual rural soviets, the TsUNKhU on 11

January gave 25 oblasts and republics a special assignment to verify the census sheets with the rural soviet population lists.

The rural soviets made a name-by-name verification of the persons registered on the census sheets with the population lists available to the rural soviet. Then, each person who was on the lists of the rural soviets but was not entered on the census sheets was questioned and the following established: a) Was he on the territory of the given rural soviet during the night of 5-6 January? and b) Was he counted where he spent the night?

In this check for 20,791 rural soviets in 25 oblasts and republics, it was discovered that 4,877 persons had been missed in the census or one person per four rural soviets. In a majority of instances, these were citizens who were absent and stated that they were not counted. The test made in certain areas on the correctness of such statements showed that a majority of the citizens who stated that they had not been counted in actuality were counted [...].

The partial materials available to the TsUNKhU show that the number of persons who stated in questioning that they had not been counted was 0.4-0.5 percent. If it is considered that a significant portion of these statements upon verification (where this was carried out) was not substantiated, it can be considered that the possible undercounting of the population by the census was fractions of a percent.

According to the census of 6 January 1937, the total number of the population was 162,003,225 persons, including the contingents of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] and the NKVD. In comparison with 1926 (the census of 17 December), the number of the population increased by 15 million persons, or by 10.2 percent, or an average of 1 percent a year. These data indicate that the increase in our population substantially surpasses the rate of the natural increase in the population of the advanced capitalist countries, for example: England (0.36 percent as an average over the 9 years from 1927 through 1935), Germany (0.58 percent), France (0.11 percent), the United States (0.66 percent as an average over the 5 years of 1930-1934), it equals the Italian (1.02 percent) and is only behind Japan (1.37 percent).

The number of the population established by the census is significantly below that which was expected according to the data of the current population count. Thus, on 1 January 1933, the TsUNKhU published the size of the population at 165.7 million and this served as the starting point for the further counts. The census has shown that the current count of the population provided incorrect and sharply inflated figures. The completely unsatisfactory state of the current count of the population is the main reason for the gap between the assumptions and the actual size of the population set by the census.

The source of the errors in the current population count was the system for registering the birth and death rates which had been exceptionally poorly organized by ZAGS [Civil Registry Office]. Up to 1933, the work of ZAGS was so poor that it could not even establish to what group of ZAGS offices the available information related and what percentage of the population this covered. Only after a special decision by the VKP(b) Central Committee on the work of the ZAGS offices and the turning of them over to the NKVD did the network of ZAGS offices begin to be organized. But even now there are defects in the work of the ZAGS offices and without eliminating these an accurate and correct current count of the population is impossible. Thus, in the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan, the network of ZAGS offices up to now has not been completely organized, the entries are far from complete and the reporting comes in poorly.

Of course, the data of the ZAGS offices over the last 2 years has improved significantly over the previous years and merits much greater confidence.

These data show a great rise in the increase of the population in comparison with the 10-year average: by 1.4-1.5 percent for 1935 and 1936 in contrast to 1 percent as an average over the decade. In the capitalist countries, on the contrary, in recent years according to the official statistical data there has been a drop in the increase in the population in comparison with the average for the decade.

The census data indicate an exceptional growth of the cities and urban population. The total number of the urban population according to the 1937 Census equals 51.9 million persons in comparison with 26.3 million persons in the 1926 Census (197.1 percent). No other nation in the world has known or does know such a growth rate of the urban population (a doubling in 10 years). The proportional amount of the urban population has risen to 31.2 percent in comparison with 17.9 percent in 1926. The total number of urban population points (cities, worker settlements and urban-type settlements) has increased from 1,925 to 3,208 over the period from 1926 through 1937. Along with the growth in the number of cities they have also become larger. In 1926 there were 86 towns and cities with a population over 50,000 each and in 1937, there were already 159 such towns and cities. In 1926, there were 3 cities with a population over 500,000 persons and now there are 8 of them.

The size of the population for the large cities can be given only minus the servicemen stationed in them, since the number of counted servicemen is known by the TsUNKhU on' for the USSR as a whole. Since the number of servicemen has increased very significantly in comparison with 1926, the obtained figures somewhat understate the actual dynamics. But even with this condition the dynamics is exceptionally indicative. In 1926, the entire urban population minus the army was 25,748,500 persons, including 13,214,700 persons or

51.3 percent in cities with a population over 50,000. In 1937, in cities with a population over 50,000 there were 29,337,100 persons out of the 50,548,400 of the total urban population, or 58.0 percent. Thus, there has been not only an increase in the urban population but also a growing of the cities, that is, the concentration of the urban population in rather large cities having significantly greater opportunities for providing amenities than the small urban-type settlements.

An analysis of the population dynamics in the individual oblasts and republics makes it possible to divide all oblasts into the following five groups:

Group 1—oblasts with a highly developed and rapidly developing industry over the last 10 years including Moscow, Donetsk, Leningrad, the DVK [Far Eastern Kray], the Eastern Siberian, Sverdlovsk and others. These oblasts have produced very high indicators for population growth over the 10 years. Moscow (+37.9 percent), Donetsk (+54.5 percent), Leningrad (+36.3 percent), DVK (+93.2 percent), Eastern Siberian (+42.9 percent), Sverdlovsk (+30.9 percent) and Gorkiy (+21.7 percent). Characteristic of all these oblasts is an enormous increase in the urban population with a low growth or even a certain decline in the rural population.

Group 2—national republics and oblasts. All of them, with the exception of Kazakhstan, are marked by a high population increase to both to the natural increase as well as the influx from outside: Uzbekistan (+28.8 percent), Tajikistan (+34.6 percent), Turkmenia (+18.8 percent), Kirghizia (+37.2 percent), Azerbaijan (+32.8 percent), Armenia (+38.6 percent), Georgia (+27.3 percent), Dagestan (+28.3 percent), Karelia (+92.0 percent) and so forth.

Group 3—oblasts of the former consuming zone with a heavy loss of population and supplying the first two groups. Here are: Kalinin Oblast, the Western and partially Yaroslavl, Kirov Oblast, Belorussia and so forth.

Group 4—oblasts with an increased coefficient close to the average and with a relatively small balance for the mechanical movement of the population. This group includes: Ivanovo Oblast (+13.9 percent), Omsk Oblast (+12.3 percent) and so forth.

Group 5—oblasts basically agricultural with unfavorable indicators for the natural movement of the population and a relatively high percentage in comparison with other oblasts of kulak elements moved outside the oblast. Here are the agricultural oblasts of the Ukraine (in addition to the Donbass), Kazakhstan, Kursk Oblast, Saratov Oblast, the Volga German ASSR, Kuybyshev Oblast, the Azov-Black Sea Kray, the Russian areas of the Northern Caucasus Kray and partially Voronezh and Stalingrad Oblasts.

One is struck by the circumstance that this group includes oblasts where the resistance of the kulakry to collectivization was the strongest and most acute and this has told on the size of the population.



The grouping carried out above reflects only the main trend in the development of each oblast, and at the same time in actuality in a number of oblasts in different areas there were different trends. For example, the overall increase in the population of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast by 6.8 percent is the result of the enormous increase in the urban population (+177.0 percent) with a simultaneous decline in the rural population by 26.3 percent. An analogous situation occurred in certain other oblasts [...].

The census results with complete clarity have shown the perfectly unsatisfactory organization of the current population count.

First of all, up to now a number of republics and oblasts still do not have ZAGS offices and the existing ZAGS offices do not sufficiently accurately regulate births and deaths and incompletely submit reporting [...].

Among the enormous mistakes in counting the size of the population for individual territories are the completely unsuitable organization by the police bodies of registration of arrivals and departures in the cities and the absolutely complete absence of accounting for the mechanical movement of the population in rural localities.

Even for such as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Kharkov where there is the best organization of the registration of arrivals and departures, the actual size of the population established by census differs sharply from calculations based on the data of entry and departure registration. For Moscow, instead of the 3,550,000 persons there were 3,798,000 persons. If one considers that a certain number of people who have long left Moscow are still registered in Moscow, it can be considered that at least 300,000 persons are living in Moscow without permission. Such a situation exists in many large cities. On the contrary, in a number of cities, the population size obtained by the census is significantly below the number obtained on the basis of the registration data.

The disordered registration of arrivals and departures not only harmed the question of counting the population but also provided an opportunity for the criminal and class-enemy elements to take cover in the cities. It is essential in the shortest period of time to systematize the organization of population registration in the cities on the basis of the full carrying out of the decree of the USSR SNK on the passport system.

As for counting the mechanical movement of the population in rural localities, a radical means for organizing this would be the introduction of a universal passport system with the ensuing procedure for registering arrival and departure. This measure would be facilitated by the fact that at least 40 percent of the entire USSR population up to the present has already received passports.

Without carrying out the above-given measures, a precise population count cannot be organized and in periods between censuses we will not have sufficiently accurate population figures both for the USSR as a whole

and particularly for the individual territories. The significant expenditures required for carrying out these measures would be more than repaid by the advantages which a correct population count provides.

In addition for a completed system of a population count which would ensure precise data on the number and composition of the USSR population, it is essential to establish a fixed periodicity of the national population censuses. In considering the exceptionally rapid changes in the USSR population, its mobility and so forth, the TsUNKhU feels that the censuses must be carried out every three years.

As for the organization of the census itself, even now one can draw the following main conclusions.

The idea of a single-day census accompanied by the preliminary filling out of blanks and control counts has proven fully effective.

A majority of the misses which occurred in the census was due to the fact that the present population was counted and they missed the people who had left for a day or two from their permanent residence [...].

For this reason in the future, proceeding from the interests of an absolutely accurate account of the population number, we must switch over in a census to counting the permanent population along with the present population [...].

The question of religion on the census blanks caused great difficulties in organizing the census as the actions by counterrevolutionary and backward elements occurred in the largest numbers precisely over this question [...].

A number of statements from census participants indicates that the number of believers was greater than they expected. This shows the very poor organization of antireligious work [...].

Of exceptional significance for the census was a system of district inspectors who provided training in the low-level groups. The census showed that the district inspectorate is the basis for organizing mass statistical work on the low level. For this reason, a system of district inspectorates must be strengthened in every possible way.

APPENDIX: Preliminary results of the All-Union Population Census of 6 January 1937 (4 Tables)

Chief of the TsUNKhU of the USSR Gosplan

(Kraval) [21]

[End of Report]



**Preliminary Results of All-Union Population Census of 1937**

Number of USSR Population on 17 December 1926 and 6 January 1937 [31]

No.		1926			1937			1937 in % of 1926		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	I. RSFSR									
1	Northern Oblast	1,007,031	1,138,065	2,145,096	1,052,381	1,209,874	2,262,255	104.5	106.3	105.5
2	Komi ASSR	102,396	122,299	224,695	156,947	152,367	309,314	153.3	124.6	137.7
3	Karelian ASSR	128,804	138,199	267,003	279,886	232,668	512,554	217.3	168.4	192.0
4	Leningrad Oblast	2,357,359	2,653,416	5,010,775	3,176,309	3,655,434	6,831,743	134.7	137.8	136.3
	Incl: City of Leningrad	735,471	824,651	1,560,122	1,270,628	1,543,846	2,814,474	172.8	187.2	180.4
5	Kalinin Oblast	1,613,529	1,873,973	3,487,502	1,491,822	1,728,842	3,220,664	92.5	92.3	92.3
6	Western Oblast	2,358,995	2,653,839	5,012,834	2,150,728	2,542,767	4,693,495	91.2	95.8	93.6
7	Moscow Oblast	4,049,541	4,631,113	8,680,654	5,622,833	6,348,534	11,971,367	138.9	137.1	137.9
	Incl: City of Moscow	958,944	1,036,308	1,995,252	1,762,955	2,035,123	3,798,078	183.8	196.4	190.4
8	Yaroslavl Oblast	937,929	1,171,927	2,109,856	1,003,807	1,193,254	2,197,057	107.0	101.8	104.1
9	Ivanovo Oblast	1,009,234	1,202,259	2,211,493	1,139,716	1,379,452	2,519,168	112.9	114.7	113.9
10	Gorkiy Oblast	1,402,793	1,623,034	3,025,827	1,701,389	1,981,619	3,683,008	121.3	122.1	121.7
11	Chuvash ASSR	422,252	466,708	888,960	477,339	546,619	1,023,958	113.0	117.1	115.2
12	Mari ASSR	228,679	259,471	488,150	260,470	301,852	562,322	113.9	116.3	115.2
13	Kirov Oblast	1,097,653	1,289,824	2,387,477	1,071,174	1,309,163	2,380,337	97.6	101.5	99.7
14	Udmurt ASSR	368,388	423,142	791,530	428,997	507,008	936,005	116.5	119.8	118.3
15	Tatar ASSR	1,198,686	1,386,350	2,585,036	1,244,180	1,491,505	2,735,685	103.8	107.6	105.8
16	Kuybyshev Oblast	2,004,337	2,277,003	4,281,340	1,790,095	2,158,151	3,948,246	89.3	94.8	92.2
17	Mordovian ASSR	589,537	670,536	1,260,073	541,892	650,120	1,192,012	91.9	97.0	94.6
18	Voronezh Oblast	2,935,048	3,281,309	6,216,357	2,761,146	3,325,688	6,086,834	94.1	101.4	97.9
19	Kursk Oblast	2,308,732	2,555,971	4,864,703	1,878,088	2,288,548	4,166,636	81.3	89.5	85.7
20	Crimea ASSR	334,454	363,979	698,433	476,184	518,614	994,798	142.4	142.5	142.4
21	Azov-Black Sea Kray	2,685,569	2,957,659	5,643,228	2,605,353	2,996,406	5,601,759	97.0	101.3	99.3

## Preliminary Results of All-Union Population Census of 1937 (Continued)

Number of USSR Population on 17 December 1926 and 6 January 1937 [31]

No.		1926			1937			1937 in % of 1926		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	Incl: Adygey AO [Autono- mous Oblast]	107,113	114,554	221,667	104,444	120,947	225,391	97.5	105.6	101.7
22	Northern Caucasus Kray	814,432	890,510	1,704,942	765,063	870,214	1,635,277	93.9	97.7	95.9
	Incl: Karachay AO	46,599	47,431	94,030	68,753	71,419	140,172	147.5	150.6	149.1
	Incl: Cherkess AO	32,737	33,632	66,369	38,896	42,156	81,052	118.8	125.3	122.1
23	Dagestan ASSR	381,539	405,844	787,383	486,774	523,110	1,009,884	127.6	128.9	128.3
24	Chech- eno- Ingush ASSR	259,314	250,741	510,055	323,789	336,049	659,838	124.9	134.0	129.4
25	Northern Ossetian ASSR	110,759	115,274	226,033	148,920	160,151	309,071	134.5	138.9	136.7
26	Kabar- dino- Balkash ASSR	116,005	114,918	230,923	164,086	168,407	332,493	141.4	146.5	144.0
27	Kalmyk ASSR	81,291	79,885	161,176	97,227	97,255	194,482	119.6	121.7	120.6
28	Stalingrad Oblast	1,023,010	1,140,684	2,163,694	1,028,945	1,195,852	2,224,797	100.6	104.8	102.8
29	Volga German ASSR	273,965	297,435	571,400	227,942	261,386	489,328	83.2	87.9	85.6
30	Saratov Oblast	1,160,714	1,289,823	2,450,537	865,020	1,021,591	1,886,611	74.5	79.2	77.0
31	Orenburg Oblast	701,347	790,864	1,492,211	734,675	831,335	1,566,010	104.8	105.1	104.9
32	Bashkir ASSR	1,201,120	1,344,045	2,545,165	1,383,912	1,572,866	2,956,778	115.2	117.0	116.2
33	Chelyab- insk Oblast	1,196,948	1,367,064	2,564,012	1,293,145	1,475,420	2,768,565	108.0	107.9	108.0
34	Sverd- lovsk Oblast	1,462,302	1,689,581	3,151,883	1,909,614	2,216,836	4,126,450	130.6	131.2	130.9
35	Omsk Oblast	1,003,487	1,072,480	2,075,967	1,099,543	1,230,877	2,330,420	109.6	114.8	112.3
36	Western Siberian Kray	2,616,814	2,742,710	5,359,524	3,071,434	3,362,093	6,433,527	117.4	122.6	120.0
	Incl: Oyrot AO	51,833	54,711	106,544	73,095	77,569	150,644	141.0	141.8	144.4

**Preliminary Results of All-Union Population Census of 1937 (Continued)**

Number of USSR Population on 17 December 1926 and 6 January 1937 [31]

No.		1926			1937			1937 in % of 1926		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
37	Krasnoyarsk Krai	700,030	720,256	1,420,286	894,805	933,941	1,828,746	124.2	129.7	128.8
	Incl: Khakas AO	57,682	57,961	155,643	116,005	120,181	236,186	201.1	207.3	204.2
38	Eastern Siberian Oblast	666,106	661,842	1,327,948	963,519	933,530	1,897,049	144.6	141.1	142.9
39	Buryat-Mongolian ASSR	263,414	263,308	526,722	322,258	325,317	647,575	122.3	123.5	122.9
40	DVK	683,769	589,626	1,273,395	1,439,449	1,041,736	2,481,185	210.5	176.7	194.8
	Incl: Jewish AO	19,007	16,533	35,540	80,215	40,789	121,004	422.0	246.7	340.5
41	Yakut ASSR	150,029	133,439	283,468	195,181	165,440	360,621	130.1	124.0	127.2
Total for RSFSR		44,007,341	49,100,405	93,107,746	48,726,033	55,241,891	103,967,924	110.7	112.5	111.7
	II. Ukraine	13,989,615	14,936,361	28,925,976	13,117,514	15,270,095	28,387,609	93.8	102.2	98.1
	Vinnitsa Oblast	2,087,702	2,270,824	4,358,526	1,760,326	2,158,410	3,918,736	84.3	95.0	89.9
	Kiev Oblast	2,791,349	3,009,563	5,800,912	2,316,790	2,781,451	5,098,241	83.0	92.4	87.9
	Chernigov Oblast	1,346,934	1,437,377	2,784,311	1,154,334	1,368,037	2,522,371	85.7	95.2	90.6
	Kharkov Oblast	2,776,929	2,945,724	5,722,653	2,321,693	2,731,738	5,053,431	83.6	92.7	88.3
	Donetsk Oblast	1,484,963	1,478,727	2,963,690	2,204,287	2,374,382	4,578,669	148.4	160.6	154.5
	Dnepropetrovsk Oblast	1,675,208	1,808,457	3,483,665	1,754,944	1,966,284	3,721,228	104.8	108.7	106.8
	Odessa Oblast	1,552,388	1,692,232	3,244,620	1,343,118	1,582,281	2,925,399	86.5	93.5	90.2
	Moldavian ASSR	274,142	293,457	567,599	262,022	307,512	569,534	95.6	104.8	100.3
	III. Belorussia	2,382,325	2,543,439	4,925,764	2,439,114	2,751,435	5,196,549	102.4	108.4	105.5
	IV. Azerbaijan	1,200,582	1,101,329	2,301,911	1,563,259	1,493,719	3,056,978	130.2	135.6	132.8
	Incl: Nakhichevan ASSR	54,584	49,223	103,807	63,898	60,300	124,198	117.1	122.5	119.6
	Incl: Nagorny Karabakh AO	63,131	62,169	125,300	74,223	72,944	147,167	117.6	117.3	117.5
	V. Georgia	1,328,501	1,324,125	2,652,626	1,682,592	1,694,354	3,376,946	126.7	128.0	127.3

## Preliminary Results of All-Union Population Census of 1937 (Continued)

Number of USSR Population on 17 December 1926 and 6 January 1937 [31]

No.		1926			1937			1937 in % of 1926		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	Incl: Abkhazian ASSR	108,522	101,750	210,272	155,904	152,621	308,525	143.7	150.0	146.7
	Incl: Adzhar ASSR	60,492	62,347	128,839	93,582	92,077	185,659	140.7	147.7	144.1
	Incl: South Ossetian AO	45,518	41,840	87,358	54,073	50,619	104,692	118.8	121.0	119.8
	VI. Armenia	440,602	432,173	872,775	614,984	594,269	1,209,253	139.6	137.5	138.6
	VII. Uzbekistan	2,393,595	2,145,398	4,538,993	3,002,404	2,845,044	5,847,448	125.4	132.6	128.8
	Incl: Kara-Kalpak ASSR	174,024	161,211	335,235	226,490	204,798	431,283	130.1	127.0	128.7
	VIII. Turkmenia	516,201	467,611	983,812	603,585	564,953	1,168,538	116.9	120.8	118.8
	IX. Tajikistan	540,738	486,088	1,026,826	717,931	664,237	1,382,168	132.8	126.6	134.6
	Incl: Gornyy-Badakhshan AO	14,842	13,741	28,583	21,161	19,784	40,945	142.6	144.0	143.2
	X. Kazakhstan	3,111,728	2,966,842	6,078,570	2,585,844	2,534,329	5,120,173	83.1	85.4	84.2
	XI. Kirghizia	518,414	479,854	998,268	691,406	678,261	1,369,667	133.4	141.3	137.2
	Total for USSR	70,429,642	75,983,625	146,413,267	75,744,666	84,338,587	160,083,253	107.5	111.0	109.3
	Above that RKKA and Border Guards of NKVD	613,710	938	614,648	1,947,438	8,779	1,956,217	317.3	935.9	318.3
	Total Population	71,043,352	75,984,563	147,027,915	77,692,104	84,347,366	162,039,470	109.4	111.0	110.2

After the completing of the census work, the TsUNKhU of the USSR Gosplan and the local UNKhU began receiving from the institutions requests for providing the census results. The needs were the most diverse and included for planning the electoral districts of the forthcoming elections [22], for compiling the plan of the Third Five-Year Plan [23], work on verifying the complete coverage of neonates by registration [24], and the Main Administration of Highways "For Determining the Labor Resources for Building Highways" [25]. The requests were given a standard answer. Characteristic is the resolution of Vermenichev to the request from the Chernigov UNKhU.

[Translation of typewritten letter to the TsUNKhU]

On 23 December 1936, in Order No 1076 of the USSR TsUNKhU an order was issued permitting the release of data on the size of the population according to the census following confidential procedures to the secretaries of the party raykoms and obkoms and to the chairmen of the rayon and oblast executive committees.

On 28 June 1937, a telegram was received from Comrade Vermenichev stating:



"I have information that certain chiefs of the UNKhU are releasing data from the population census. I categorically warn against the dissemination of census data until further instructions. Guilty parties will be held strictly responsible—Vermenichev.

In accord with the instructions, we have issued a categorical ban to the rayons on releasing to anyone whomsoever data on the number of the population according to the census.

In line with the approaching elections to the Supreme Soviet, and the need to have data on the number of the population for dividing the territories of the oblast and the rayons into electoral districts and precincts, we have been receiving requests from the oblast and rayon organizations to be provided with information on the size of the population according to the census.

I wait your instructions.

Chief of the Oblast UNKhU (Grayfer).

[End of text of letter]

But a portion of the information still escaped from the walls of the TsUNKhU to the Air Defense Directorate of the RKKA, to the Scientific Research Institute for the Great Soviet World Atlas.... But these were isolated instances.

Actually, immediately after receiving the first census results, they canceled the effect of the TsUNKhU circular of 23 December 1936 No. 1076 which allowed the number of the population to be provided secretly to the party raykoms and obkoms and to the rayispolkoms. On 21 June, the local census bureaus were sent a directive letter from the TsUNKhU Deputy Chief Popov on the procedure for turning in and storing all auxiliary materials of the population census. This ordered that all materials including tables, lists of population points, telegrams on the number of the population, correspondence, the results of the 5th control sample and so forth be turned over to the TsUNKhU Special Sector [26]. On 5 July, the TsUNKhU sent out a Secret Directive Instructions No. 654 to all three MSS (machine accounting stations) on altering the procedure for reporting and storing the materials in the direction of hardening the security classification system [27]. Just 2 days later, the Head of the TsUNKhU Secret Unit Antonov checked the possible channels for the leaking of information within the TsUNKhU and verified the number of printed copies of the census results.

[Translation of manuscript letter]

To the Head of the Secret Section of the TsUNKhU, Comrade Antonov.

To your request concerning the printing and dissemination of the brief reports of the 1937 Population Census, I inform you of the following:

The first brief census results were printed by Brandt on 11 January in four copies and were sent out on 11 January to Comrade Stalin, Comrade Molotov and on 13 January to Comrade Mezhlauk. The fourth copy was kept by Kraval.

Later prints were made as needed once or twice upon Kraval's instructions and he ordered my secretary Golfand to organize the printing of the results.

As far as I know, copies of the brief results of the 1937 Population Census were also sent to Comrades Yezhov, Bauman and Yakovlev. In addition to this, Comrade Popov had one copy and several copies (also in manuscript) are kept by Brandt.

I do not know whether other copies were sent out to anyone.

I was instructed only to check the printed figures with the results and transfer the figures to a map which was sent out with each copy of the brief results.

[Signature illegible].

[End of text of letter]

Kraval's secretary Golfand provided additional information: "...The copies of the concise results of the 1937 Census were sent out to Comrades Yezhov, Bauman and Yakovlev. In addition, Popov had one copy and Brandt had several copies (also rough copies)..." [28].

The census workers were brought to court for the loss of insignificant materials [29]. The security classification on the main census results became ever-harsher.

The nature of the reports altered. At the end of April, the Chief of the Leningrad Oblast and City UNKhU Serov dispatched a note to the Deputy TsUNKhU Chief A.S. Popov written in rather academic tones, where along with valid comments, there can be seen a desire to obtain politically correct conclusions.

[Beginning of report]

#### COMMENTS ON SHORTCOMINGS IN ORGANIZING POPULATION CENSUS AND ITS ANALYSIS

The basic conditions which determined the success of the census are the careful training of the census takers and the population, the organizing of the census which ensures a complete census and accuracy of reports to the questions on the census sheet.

Among the most prominent shortcomings in organizing the census is the insufficiently satisfactory elaboration of the instructions to fill out the census sheet by the TsUNKhU Population Census Bureau. The instructions for filling out as approved by the USSR SNK upon the proposal of the TsUNKhU have suffered from a number of substantial shortcomings. Among these are: 1) The instructions excessively orient the population and the census personnel to undocumented replies and each is

given an opportunity on all the questions to answer as he considers necessary and this greatly impedes the activity of the census taker. For example, it is now clear that independent handicraftsmen almost always call themselves workers and in leafing through the census sheets handicraftsmen are virtually not encountered at all. This also reduces the responsibility of the census takers who with any problem could refer to the population. 2) The instructions did not provide complete instructions on how the various questions should be answered. For example, on question 8 of the census sheet "Are you literate," the instructions merely limited themselves to indicating "enter" "yes" or "no." The instructions also provided very meager explanations for the 5th question of the census sheet concerning "religion," question 14 and a number of others. The more active commentary on individual questions was moved from the basic instructions into the second unofficial instructions which were assigned only for the census personnel. The presence of two sets of instructions—the official approved by the USSR SNK and the additional ones—disoriented the census taker. Thus, according to the official instructions, the census taker had the formal right to restrict himself on questions of literacy to the terse reply of those questioned to "yes" or "no," while the additional instructions pointed out that a person who is able to read, albeit slowly, is to be considered literate. The population did not know about this or was little informed. As a result, it can be assumed that for such questions as literacy and religion we have a number of substantial flaws which can tell on the results of the census. The check on the correctness of the replies to the question of illiteracy and carried out by the Leningrad UNKhU in Batetskiy Rayon of Leningrad Oblast confirmed the presence of a number of instances when individual citizens who were able to read stated that they were illiterate out of humility: "What sort of literate person am I as I write as an illiterate."

A full explanation of the task of the All-Union Census, the active participation of the local party and soviet bodies and the press and radio in preparing for the census exclude the possibility of the mass missing of the population, the missing of villages, settlements, houses and so forth. However, the doubts as to the completeness of the census are valid in terms of covering that portion of the population which was traveling from place to place on the day of the census. For this category of the population there is no guarantee for a complete coverage. In the first place it is impossible to guarantee a 100-percent coverage of the trains by a population census [...]. But there is a particularly high probability of missing among the population which was moving on foot, on horseback and on vehicles [...]. The system of crossing out without giving the reasons and the entry on the census sheet of 6 January also without indicating the reason for the miss on the day of the preliminary fill-out led to the impossibility of verifying the complete coverage of this category of the population. The attempt to verify where the persons who had been crossed out in

two rayons of Leningrad Oblast, Kirshskiy and Kapshinskiy, showed that all the persons crossed off had been counted but for this a great deal of effort and an enormous amount of energy had to be expended. The great importance of the question of those crossed off can be judged from the fact that just in Leningrad Oblast alone, there were 138,051 persons crossed off, that is, 2.2 percent. At present, it is perfectly obvious that in all instances of crossing off or the additional entry, it is essential to make a note as to the reasons which caused these changes.

Preparations for the mechanized processing of the census material and the scheme itself for analysis also suffer from a number of substantial shortcomings. First of all, these include the unsatisfactory preparation of the dictionaries. Along with the dictionary of religions which includes a list of unnecessary and improbable sects with at times unprintable names, the basic dictionary—the dictionary of occupations was compiled unsatisfactorily. The basic flaw of the dictionary of occupations is that it suffers from incompleteness due to the isolation of its compilers from the local conditions [...].

The code established by the TsUNKhU Population Census Bureau in a number of instances leads to a reduction in the skill level of the population. This applies first of all to specialists holding leading positions, regardless of the scale. Thus, according to the instructions of the TsUNKhU, one code is used /4-9/ and consequently all leading personnel will be analyzed together whether they are from institutions, organizations, enterprises, shops, departments, units and so forth [...].

The designated situation can be rectified only in the instance that the code is corrected and all the material which has currently been encoded is recoded. The second major defect of the code and the analysis scheme is the placing of all students, including students of institutions of higher learning, academies and technical schools and the students of all sorts of extended training and retraining courses as dependents of private individuals. As is generally known, an enormous percentage of students in the technical schools, institutions of higher learning and all sorts of courses receives a state scholarship and, consequently, are dependents of the state. At the same time, according to the analysis scheme, all students are considered as dependents of private individuals. This not only reduces the number of dependents of the state among whom remain only pensioners and the inmates of children's homes but leads to a whole series of politically incorrect and harmful indicators which characterize our population. The census data undoubtedly will be used by the leading bodies for calculating a coefficient of dependence. This indicator is extremely important, both from the viewpoint of considering the material prosperity of the population as well as from the viewpoint of the labor balance. The use of the census results according to the current analysis scheme leads to a situation where an enormous number of adults will be entered as being dependent upon private individuals and a distorted notion will be created about the presence of

unemployment in our country. The labor balance compiled on the basis of the census data also will be fictitious and misleading. The situation undoubtedly can be rectified with a corresponding change in the code and the analysis scheme. This can somewhat delay the analysis but on the other hand will provide a correct illumination of this very important question.

We must also consider as politically harmful the idea of the TsUNKhU Population Census Bureau in the sense that all kolkhoz members working at the moment of the census, even for several days in a forest, be considered workers and not kolkhoz members. Such a view has consciously reduced the number of kolkhoz members and inflated the number of the working class in rural localities. Moreover, as a result of this idea, the characteristics of the working class will be distorted because its composition will include a large number of kolkhoz members who have completely different characteristics than the worker in terms of literacy, religion, education and so forth. The repeated posing of this question before the TsUNKhU Population Census Bureau did not lead to anything and all the same for Leningrad Oblast, the Oblast UNKhU ordered the census workers to enter all kolkhoz members working in the forest as kolkhoz members, if they considered themselves as such.

Recently (at the beginning of April), the TsUNKhU Census Bureau has changed its view and has proposed that the kolkhoz workers felling timber be coded not as workers but as kolkhoz members. For those oblasts where the census was carried out strictly according to the idea of the TsUNKhU on the given question, these new orders have actually no significance because from the census sheets it is virtually impossible to establish which of the woodcutters are kolkhoz members. Thus, in a conversation with the chief of the Karelian UNKhU, Comrade Ivanov, it became apparent that in the Karelian Republic all the kolkhoz woodcutters (and there are many of them) were entered and coded as workers. At present, it is not possible to correct the material. In order to bring the census material into conformity with reality there must be additional calculations of an extremely approximate nature.

Chief of the Leningrad Oblast and  
City UNKhU (Serov) [30]

[End of report]

In July, the chief of the Leningrad UNKhU and author of the quoted "Comments" submitted to the TsUNKhU a new report on the 1937 Census. Serov understood the situation more certainly and it was clear to him that the basic "defect" of the census was in its most fundamental results, that is, the assessment of the size of the population.

The note "On the Results of the Size of the Population From the 1937 Census" begins with the words: "The subversive organization of the 1937 Population Census has led to a situation where a portion of the population has not been covered by the census" [32]. In contrast to

the first note, where the question of the size of the population was a minor episode, now four groups of uncounted population are listed. In the first place, there were possible losses in the event of the absence of a person on 6 January at the place of the preliminary entry, if he did not give information about himself at another place. Persons were also missed who were traveling on transport but not on the long distance trains. Secondly, Serov continued, there were possible misses in those places where the census was carried out by departments. There were two other probable sources of undercounting in the decasse, the passportless and unregistered elements as well as "members of sects and other persons who refuse the census under the influence of class enemy agitation" [33]. The note then goes on to attempt to obtain the largest possible figure for the undercounting of the population in Leningrad and the oblast. In his calculations the author along with likely (although maximized) assessments, uses rather arbitrary extrapolations of the corrections for the undercounting. The result of the undercounting, as might be expected, appears more than impressive: 1.3 percent for the city and 3.2 percent for the oblast [34].

Some six months after conducting the census, the fate of its materials had still not been determined.

There was an alternative. Either repudiate the census results or publish the obtained data (but then these would have to be explained). They would have to draw on materials relating to the movement of the population in the intercensus period, and including:

The natural increase in the population (according to the TsUNKhU data) in percent: 22.8 in 1927, 24.8 in 1928, 20.8 in 1929, 18.8 in 1930, 15.8 in 1931, 11.4 in 1932, 7.9 in 1933, 7.2 in 1934, 14.7 in 1935 and 14.4 in 1936 [35].

"Out of the total official increase in the population by 1,109,000, the Ukraine was responsible for 950,000 or 85.7 percent. In 1933, the Ukraine produced 1,309,000 deaths or almost 641,000 more than in 1932; births were 358,900 against 782,000 in 1932" [36].

The population dynamics of Kazakhstan over the period of 1930-1936 (on 1 June of each year) according to the data of the Kazakh UNKhU was: 5,873,000 in 1930, 5,114,000 in 1931, 3,227,000 in 1932, 2,493,500 in 1933, 2,681,800 in 1934, 2,926,000 in 1935 and 3,287,900 in 1936 [37].

As a whole, the variation of explanations was proposed on 14 March by the Deputy Chief of the Department of Population and Public Health of the TsUNKhU in Kurman in a report to Kraval who remained working as the chief of the TsUNKhU of the USSR Gosplan for just a few days.

[Start of report]



**TO THE CHIEF OF THE TSUNKHU OF THE USSR  
GOSPLAN, COMRADE I.A. KRAVAL**

**REPORT ON THE NATURAL MOVEMENT OF  
THE POPULATION IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN  
THE TWO CENSUSES OF 17 DECEMBER 1926  
AND 6 JANUARY 1937**

According to the data of the 1926 Census, in the USSR there were 147 million persons; according to the data of the 1937 Census there are 162 million persons. Thus, the USSR population has risen by 15 million persons according to the data of the two censuses.

According to the data of the registration of births and deaths, the increase in the population over this same period is 21.3 million persons or 6.3 million more.

On characterizing the completeness of the registration data of ZAGS, the following can be said: Up to 1933, there were no numerical materials on the coverage of the territory by the ZAGS count and in recent years the coverage of the population by the ZAGS count has been characterized by the following figures:

	Number of Population for Territory Sub- mitting Reporting in % of Total USSR Population	% of Coverage of Population by ZAGS Count Within the Reported	% of Coverage by Count of USSR Popula- tion (1:2)
1933	83.2	94.6	78.2
1934	90.7	95.7	86.8
1935	97.6	98.3	95.9
1936*			

\* Still no annual count. Coverage at least 96%.

Thus, the direct report data cover a predominant portion of the USSR population and the given additions involved only territories with an insignificant part of the USSR population. With certain conditionalities of these calculations, they could not in any significant way influence the overall picture of the increase in the USSR population (21.3 million).

However, we possess virtually no numerical data on the completeness of the involvement of the population in registering cases of births and deaths even on territories for which the reporting is correct.

At the same time, there is a number of reasons to assert that the registration of births and particularly deaths has been incomplete and this has been caused chiefly by the possibility of burying corpses without a certificate of the ZAGS and, consequently, without registration (particularly in rural localities) and in part according to certain local rites (the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, Kalmyk ASSR and elsewhere).

This undercounting has been noticed by the Department for Population and Public Health in a number of notes

(reports related to investigating the organization of the primary registration of births and deaths).

Can it be felt that the entire gap of over 6 million is due to defects in counting the natural movement of the population?

Certain calculations show the incorrectness of this assumption.

Such a gap can occur only as a consequence of the undercounting of deaths (the double counting of births in any mass amount is improbable).

But since in actuality there is a certain undercounting of births (although clearly in smaller amounts than the undercounting of deaths), in actuality for establishing a gap of 6.3 million persons the undercounting of deaths should be at least 8 million persons.

Over the last decade, the total number of deaths according to the calculations of the Population Department based on the ZAGS materials equals approximately 32.5 million persons, and with the addition of 8 million it should equal slightly more than 40 million.

Thus, this calculation shows that the relating of the entire amount of the gap to this flaw in calculating the natural movement of the population would mean undercounting one out of every five deaths over an average of 10 years (8 million:40). Such a percentage of undercounting the deaths is improbable all the more as for the last several years the situation with the ZAGS reporting has significantly improved and thus virtually the entire undercounting of deaths should be concentrated in a segment of time of 7-8 years and this in practical terms would mean for these years that there is an undercounting of one out of every four or even three deaths.

On the other hand, if one accepts that the number of deaths over the last 20 years equals 40 million, with the relatively low death rate in recent years (since 1934-1936, around 8 million), then over the 7 years the number of deaths was not more than 32 million, or an average of over 4.5 million a year, or approximately, 30 persons died per 1,000 of the population per year. Such a death rate is impossible under USSR conditions as it is more than twice the amount of the death rate of all the European nations and coincides with a death rate of the population in the old Russian Empire which stood in first place for this indicator.

All the stated, forces one to seek out an explanation for the gap not only due to the figures for the natural movement of the population but also due to other sources.

1. Such a source, in the first place, is the moving of a portion of the population outside the USSR over this interval. As was stated by the Kazakh UNKhU (see explanatory note to calculating the size of the population in Kazakhstan from January 1927 through 1 January 1937), the number of persons who left Kazakhstan for



beyond the USSR (minus persons returning) was 1.3 million persons in 1930-1932.

Since the processes of immigration from Kazakhstan outside the USSR also occurred in 1933 and since similar phenomenon were also found on other territories (Turkmenia and Tajikistan), unconditionally the number of persons who left the USSR should be increased. Considering those returning, it can still be assumed that the balance was approximately around 2 million persons who over this period left the USSR.

The circumstance that Turkmenia, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan increased their population between the two censuses at rates higher than the USSR average still does not bespeak the impossibility of the emigration of population from these regions outside the USSR. The problem is that there has been intense migration into these regions from other USSR regions for new construction projects and so forth.

2. The second source for the gap must be sought out in the population figures under the 1926 Census.

Undoubtedly, in certain individual regions and in particular the national minority ones, the 1926 Census produced a certain undercounting, but on the other hand, there is reason to assert that for the nation as a whole the 1926 Census produced an overcount and this derived from the very organization of the 1926 Census.

As is known, the 1926 Census lasted 7 days in the city and 15-20 days in rural localities. Everyone was asked to state where they had spent the night of 16-17 December. Under the conditions of such a protracted period of conducting the census, the count of the present population should inevitably have produced an overcount.

This can be seen from a verification of the count accuracy for the present population carried out in Germany by Beckerman (Gozulov, "Perepisi naseleniya" [Population Censuses], p 66). Beckerman established an overcount amounting to 0.7 percent for Germany.

In considering the much greater duration of holding the census in the USSR, the great mobility of the population, the size of the territory and considering, on the other hand, a certain undercount in the nationality regions, it can be assumed that the 1926 Census produced an overcount of about 1 percent, that is, around 1.5 million persons.

3. The one-day holding of the 1937 Census led, as a test has shown, to a certain undercounting of the population. With the various estimates of the degree of the undercount, it can be assumed that as an average for the USSR, the 1937 Census is short by 0.5-0.6 of a percent of the population and this is around a million persons.

Incidentally, it must be pointed out that the checks could not because of their very organization cover persons who consciously avoided the census (in the cities, those without passports or residence permits and so forth), and a portion of these clearly did not get into the census.

The listed three sources explain a gap of approximately 4.5 million persons.

4. The remaining 3.5 million persons clearly occurred due to the undercounting of the deaths over the last decade.

For the individual years, this undercount varied and approached a maximum in 1933.

A number of special surveys with visits to the spot have shown that in the Ukraine, in the Azov-Black Sea Kray, Saratov and Stalingrad Kray, Kursk and Voronezh Oblasts there has been a significant number of deaths not recorded in the ZAGS books.

On the basis of the available materials, it can be considered that in 1933, there were around a million deaths not recorded (according to the data of the Population Department), the number of deaths in 1933 was around 5.7 million, and with the addition of the undercount around 6.7 million persons (15 percent undercount). Such a percentage of an undercount was also possible for 1933.

Further, it can be thought that from the uncounted number of deaths, at least 1-1.5 million were due to deaths the registration of which did not enter the general civilian records (special settlers, prisoners in concentration camps and so forth). Clearly these data should be with the GULAG [Main Administration for Camps] and the NKVD.

Thus, due to the ZAGS registration for the 9 years there was an undercount of approximately 1-1.5 million persons per 27 million and this is an undercount of 3.7-5.6 percent.

In considering approximately that for 1935-1936, the percentage of undercount could be over 3 (5 million), this produces an undercount for the absolute number of deaths for 1935-1936 or around 150,000, and we have a balance of 850,000-1,350,000 for the 7 years and this can be more or less be evenly distributed, comprising an average of 121,400-192,900 per year.

Deputy Chief of the Department

of Population and Public Health

(Kurman) [38]

The question of the census materials was settled on 25 September. By the decree of the SNK, the 1937 Census was declared defective and classified [39].

*To Be Continued*

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21. Ibid., file 151, sheets 148-160. In the quoted document, certain nonessential details of an organizational nature are omitted.

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#### **A Disagreeing Audience (Change in Effectiveness Criteria of Mass Information Media in Process of Society Democratization)**

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[Article by Oleg Timofeyevich Manayev, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate for the Special-Problem Laboratory of Sociological Research at the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin. Our journal has published his article "Involvement of the Individual in the Sphere of Influence of Mass Information Media" (No 4, 1984)]

[Text] As in a majority of the world's nations, in the Soviet Union mass communications has presently become one of the most important factors and means of not only spiritual development but also political and socioeconomic. The quantitative coverage of the population by the various media in the 1970s became almost absolute: 96 percent of the nation's population received the First Program of Central Television, and 100 percent received the First Program of the All-Union Radio. According to the data of numerous sociological studies, the audience of certain central and local newspapers reaches 80-90 percent of the potential readers [1]. Under these conditions, the theorists and practical workers of

mass communications have realized that its real effectiveness should be determined on the basis of qualitative indicators. The diversity of the corresponding approaches proposed over the last decade is very great. But probably the most widespread is the so-called "targeted" or "program-targeted" approach in accord with which the effectiveness of the media is determined as a measure of achieving the set goal considering the expenditures of time and resources [2, 3]. The merit of this approach is primarily in its simplicity and obviousness: actually, even K. Marx pointed out that the goal is a system-forming element of any activity. As for the goals of the media, these are defined quite uniformly in a majority of scientific publications on the problems of effectiveness and differ little in principle from the political which are constantly reproduced in the corresponding directive documents. As a rule, it is a question of the "ideological and political education of the masses," "the development of the social activeness of people," "forming a Marxist-Leninist ideology and ideological conviction of the individual" and so forth [2, 4].

In accord with the given approach, the effectiveness of the influence of the media on the audience is interpreted as the closeness of the models of social reality (a model as a system of certain knowledge, values and standards represented in the content of the mass information) with the models represented in mass awareness [5]. In other words, the reader, listener or viewer who accepts the models offered by the newspapers, radio and television, that is, incorporates them in his cognitive-emotional and motivational structure is, correspondingly, the "positive result" of mass communications while the person who does not accept these models is its "negative result" (or at least, the absence of a "positive result"). Such an interpretation as a whole has not caused any doubts for us, and for this reason the main hypothesis of the undertaken research was the assumption according to which the audience which accepts the models proposed by the media should be characterized by a higher level of self-awareness and social activeness than an audience which does not accept these models.

The research was carried out under the leadership and with the participation of the author in 1964-1988 in the Special-Problem Laboratory for Sociological Research at Belorussian State University within the project "Effectiveness of Media Influence on Various Groups of Belorussian Youth." The most important principle of the research (and in all of its stages including programming, organization and analysis of results) was the principle of comparative analysis, its basic procedures were carried out with an interval of 2 years and the instrumentarium and objects of research were unchanged. Thus, in the autumn of 1985, following a representative sample, a questioning was carried out of five basic socioclass groups of Belorussian youth at an age from 16 to 30 years: workers, kolkhoz members, white-collar personnel and engineers-technicians, students in institutions of higher learning, students of secondary schools and vocational-technical schools (in

accord with that audience differentiation which is actually achieved by the editors of newspapers, radio and TV) with a total of 2,000 persons and 400 in each group, with a sampling error in each group of 5 percent.

In the autumn of 1987, using the same questionnaire, a poll was taken for students of the same institutions of higher learning and schools with a total of 800 persons. Other groups were not questioned a second time as it was established that for a majority of the investigated parameters, the differences between the socioclass groups of the youth were insignificant with a real differentiation realized for other indicators such as sociopsychological and mass communications. The polls were conducted on the job or at the place of study of the youth.

In parallel with the polls for a representative annual sample, content analysis was carried out on the special-problem announcements in the youth newspapers, radio and TV of the republic: in 1985, 750 texts were analyzed and in 1987, 850. The questionnaire and the table of the content analysis were worked out on the basis of the general empirical indicators and this made it possible to examine the character and dynamics of the interaction of information and mass awareness in the process of communications.

Our project studied several social problems the importance of which was determined by an expert poll and content analysis of announcements of the youth media: a harmonious combination of personal and social interests, involving the youth in the process of social administration, improving mutual understanding, contacts and leisure of the youth (in 1987, the problem of social deviations among the youth was added to these).

As is known, the shaping of audience attitude toward the content and very source of information is a complex process which arises out of the interaction of elements which vary in importance: interest (or attention) in the information, its comprehension, retention and discussion. The interaction of these elements is summed up in a way in the agreeing and trust of the audience. In actuality, agreement with the views contained in the specific messages, from the position of the source as a whole, gives rise to a feeling of psychological closeness, identification with the content and source of information. Trust characterizes an attitude of now a higher level. It has been shown that persons who trust a given information source are inclined not to note those elements of the content which evoke miscomprehension or disagreements in them.

Regardless of the close linkage, these characteristics express an attitude of a varying level: in any audience, as a rule, there are significantly more disagreeing persons than nonbelieving ones. Thus, according to the data of the 1985 poll, 71 percent of the respondents usually or sometimes did not agree with the opinion of the newspapers, radio and TV, while 29 percent usually or sometimes did not trust them. The most important for us was the fact that the agreement and trust "sum up"



virtually all other elements of the audience attitude toward the media. The agreeing and trusting persons much more frequently than the disagreeing and non-trusting ones use the mass information, they are satisfied with the results of appealing with letters and materials to the editors, they accept the "heroes" and reject the "antiheroes" of propaganda, they share the "image" of the media formed by propaganda ("the media are a rostrum of public opinion accessible for all"), and they evidence a higher level of information about those events which were taken up in the media messages (Table 1).

**Table 1: Relationship of Agreement and Trust With Other Elements of Audience Attitude Toward Media, % of Those Questioned\***

Indicators of Attitude Toward Media	Agree With Media		Trust Media	
	Usually Agree	Usually Do Not Agree	Usually Trust	Usually Do Not Trust
Do not read newspaper ZNAMYA YUNOSTI	13.8	30.6	11.6	23.7
Do not listen to radio	9.3	22.2	4.5	23.7
Not satisfied by results of writing to editors	31.3	55.6	26.6	50.0
Feel that media basically reflect opinion of:				
Broad strata of the youth	25.2	11.4	23.8	11.1
Leaders of varying level	5.9	31.4	6.3	47.2
Disclose low level of information about events:				
In USSR	19.6	45.8	14.5	46.7
Abroad	15.7	29.2	9.5	31.0

\* The table is read as follows: out of all respondents who usually agree with the opinion of the media, 13.8 percent do not read the newspaper at all and of those who usually do not agree the figure is 30.6 percent (the remaining answers on the regularity of reading in both groups have been dropped) and so forth. The same is true for the groups of trusting and nontrusting persons.

From the table it can be seen that among those who usually disagree and do not trust, the figure is double those who do not read the newspaper ZNAMYA YUNOSTI [the most popular newspaper in the republic

which is read with varying regularity by 85 percent of the youth] at all, several times more than those who do not listen to the radio at all (the difference for TV is insignificant, as generally there are virtually none who do not watch television among the youth), and double the figure of those dissatisfied with the results of writing to the editors. However, here all these elements of the attitude of the audience to the media are closely interrelated and one cannot help but draw attention to the simple and obvious fact that if, as was pointed out at the beginning of the article, at present virtually all the youth with one or another degree of regularity consumes mass information, far from all the audience expresses agreement or trust in it. Moreover, regardless of the virtually unchanged level in the consumption of mass information, agreement and trust in it recently have not only not increased but, on the contrary, have substantially declined. According to the data of our research, from the autumn of 1985 through the autumn of 1987, the number of those who usually or sometimes do not agree increase by 13 percent while those who usually or sometimes do not trust rose by more than 20 percent. Consequently, the shaping and development of audience attitude toward the media are determined not only by their own, inner patterns but also by the external conditions and factors. In the process of mass communication there is an interaction, putting it figuratively, between three worlds: the world reflected in the consciousness of the audience; the world reflected in the mass information; social reality itself, the very real world. Let us examine the influence of each of these on the shaping and development of audience agreement and trust in the media—or putting it more accurately, disagreement and mistrust—since in accord with the target approach the degree of agreement and trust is one of the most important criteria for media effectiveness and their influence on the audience.

In speaking about personal (or audience) factors of disagreement and mistrust of the media, many researchers note such properties of the youth as youth isolationism and negativism, the limited nature of social experience, the contradictoriness of opinions and conduct, increased emotionalness and vulnerability, a desire for independence and at the same time the imitating of standards widespread among contemporaries and so forth [6]. A similar list for many years now has been roaming from one publication to another. Here it is clearly understood that to the degree that the designated sociopsychological traits are inherent to the youth as such, so in the mind of a majority of the young people there potentially exists a definite disagreement with the images, values and standards of "adults," including for the media. And since these qualities are inherent precisely to the youth, a majority of people, having crossed a certain age threshold (for example, the age of 30), naturally, so to speak, free themselves of this "apriori disagreement."

The results of our research to a significant degree destroy this scientific-political stereotype. For example, let us



take youth negativism. In and of itself this trait of the youth is not disputed. But an analysis of the results of both polls indicates that among those who disagree and mistrust there are many more representatives of the "median" (21-25 years) and particularly the "elder" (26-30 years) age groups than among those who agree and trust: the gap between them reaches 12-25 percent. Or such a widespread stereotype as the limited nature of social experience among the youth. It is hard to dispute but it is a paradox that among the workers who possess clearly greater social experience than, for instance, schoolchildren or students of the PTU [vocational-technical school], the level of disagreement and mistrust of the media is higher (the level reaches 7-11 percent) and not lower than among students. Many such "paradoxes" can be given. They all show one thing: in and of themselves the properties of the youth can be viewed solely as a precondition for mistrust and disagreement with the media but not as factors which define or particularly determine the direction and intensity of this process. At the same time, from mass communications theory it is known that without considering the personal (audience) factors, a scientific analysis of media influence is impossible.

The results of our and certain other research [7] persuasively indicates that such a system-forming factor is the social adaptability or, more broadly, the degree of the socialization of the individual, that is, the adopting by him of values, standards and social roles of the given society. In speaking about the youth, its marginal situation in the social structure and the system of social relations is frequently emphasized, for example: it "still is not..." (has not acquired a profession or the necessary skill level, does not have economic independence, or has not become a full principal of the political process and so forth). And since the youth "is still not" in terms of the external manifestation of its vital activities, then consequently, the same is true for the inner ones: its convictions and philosophy still have not been finally formed. In such logic, in our opinion, there are two substantial flaws. In the first place, by the age of 16 (a majority of Soviet researchers link the age limit with the receiving of a passport), the personality of a young person to a significant degree has already been shaped as for many years it has been in the sphere of influence of such socializing institutions as the family, the school, the collectives of contemporaries, the Pioneer and Komsomol organizations and so forth. Secondly, the forming and development of convictions and the philosophy of a person continue over all his life. For this reason, the social and ideological position of a young audience undoubtedly has its qualitative definiteness.

Let us examine in what manner the social position of a young person is interrelated to his attitude toward the media. As the empirical indicators of the attitude, let us take the degree of agreement and trust of the media and as the empirical indicators of social position the satisfaction with study, grades, the assessment of the moral and psychological climate of one's collective, participation in the running of its affairs, the intensity of speaking

at various meetings, the assessment of one's influence on the various levels of the social structure and the assessment of the possibilities of self-realization in society. Understandably, the high importance of these indicators shows a high degree of the socialization of the personality, and a low one the reverse. The data given in Table 2 are so eloquent that certainly no commentary is required. But still let us draw particular attention to the assessment of the real opportunities in no way (in academic, labor and social activities as in everyday life) to disrupt the moral and political standards of Soviet society, since this, in our view, can be viewed as a sort of "superstandard" as the group of those agreeing and trusting views the realisticness of this standard is from 5-6-fold higher than the group of those who do not agree or mistrust. On the basis of this table, it is possible to conclude that those who do not agree with the media or mistrust them are chiefly the persons who for various reasons have not become fully involved in the existing social structure and the system of social relations or have "dropped out" of it.

**Table 2: Relationship of Social Position of Young Audience and Its Attitude Toward Media, % of Those Questioned\***

Indicators of Social Position of Youth Audience	Agree With Media		Trust Media	
	Usually Agree	Usually Do Not Agree	Usually Trust	Usually Do Not Trust
Grades of "good" and "excellent"	58.8	33.4	55.8	44.7
Do not feel happiness and satisfaction from studies	21.1	44.7	18.5	42.7
Moral-psychological climate of one's collective viewed as "unsatisfactory" and "very bad"	13.5	38.9	19.3	39.5
Does not participate in running affairs of collective	35.6	60.0	33.4	65.8
Upon own initiative does not speak at meetings	39.5	55.6	37.9	57.9
Feels that their opinion cannot play any role in decision taking:				
On level of organization (school, VUZ, PTU)	32.2	44.4	29.3	43.2
On level of city, republic, nation	41.4	61.1	42.6	73.0
Feel that they do not have any opportunities:				
To realize their interests and abilities	9.5	17.1	9.1	23.7
Participate in running affairs of collective	16.4	25.7	16.9	25.0

**Table 2: Relationship of Social Position of Young Audience and Its Attitude Toward Media, % of Those Questioned\***

Indicators of Social Position of Youth Audience	Agree With Media		Trust Media	
	Usually Agree	Usually Do Not Agree	Usually Trust	Usually Do Not Trust
To communicate fully, to find mutual understanding with others, to spend leisure in an interesting and active manner	1.7	18.2	3.8	11.8
No opportunity to violate moral-political standards of society	6.2	36.1	6.9	33.3

\* The table has been constructed in the same manner as Table 1 and it shows the extreme limits in terms of attitude toward the media according to the data of the 1987 poll.

Here it is essential to emphasize two important circumstances. In the first place, the disagreement and mistrust of the media in no way are an exclusive "prerogative" of the youth audience. The results of our previous research conducted at the beginning of the 1980s clearly showed that among the persons disagreeing and mistrusting there are as many middle-aged persons as there are young people. Secondly, in the given instance, it is a matter not so much of who has lost his social status or who is usually called a failure as it is those who have been "squeezed" into the periphery of social relations, that is, do not possess sufficient opportunities for self-realization. Among the persons who agree and disagree there are representatives of virtually all the youth groups which differ in terms of sex, age, education, place of residence, socioprofessional status, and their material situation does not differ in any essential manner. Consequently, the decisive influence on the process being analyzed is found not so much in the objective social status of a person as his perception and awareness of this status (and the entire system of social relations as a whole). In other words, it is not so much the social as it is the ideological position of the individual as an "inner" form for manifesting the degree of its socialization.

In studying the attitude of the youth to the models of social reality propagandized by the media, we discovered that one of its determinants is the aspect in which the reader, listener or viewer perceives, assesses, explains and mentally resolves one or another social problem. In the process of analysis, three such aspects have been turned up: ideological-moral or educational, sociopolitical and organizational-economic or pragmatic, and the corresponding free sociopsychological types of audience. The attitude of the individuals of the first type who can be conditionally termed "ideologists" or "educators" is briefly characterized by the judgment: "the basic reason for the rise of social problems is to be found in the imperfection of man himself. These will be resolved only when the educational and ideological work is well organized." The attitude of the representatives of the second type who can conditionally be called "politicians" is

characterized by the judgment: "the hope of educating a new man is an utopia. It is essential that the state and public organizations abandon the formalism and bureaucracy, and give more consideration to the interests of the youth and rely on their initiative." Finally, the viewpoint of the individuals who can be termed "technocrats" or "pragmatists" is characterized by the judgments: "social problems can be resolved only by accelerating the development of the economy, our material-technical and financial opportunities." The comparative factor analysis has shown that the given types of audience are very stable and to a definite degree are invariant in relation to the content of the examined problems and are also across-the-board in terms of the sociodemographic, professional, geographic and other social characteristics of the audience. An additional analysis of certain descriptive features of these types has shown that they characterize the attitude not only toward the media but also toward social reality as a whole. For this reason, precisely such a criterion as a viewpoint was used as the empirical indicator for the ideological position of the youth, as somewhat tinting surrounding reality in one or another color.

The data of our research indicate that in the group of persons agreeing with and trusting the media, there is a dominance of the "educators" ("ideologists"), while in the group of persons who do not agree and do not trust, it is the "pragmatists" ("technocrats"); the "politicians" in this regard are rather ambivalent although there are more of them among those who do not agree. This dependence is fixed quite definitely in analyzing the results of both the simple distribution (the replies were analyzed to the questions of the paradigmatic block of the questionnaire in the groups of agreeing—trusting and disagreeing—mistrusting) as well as factor analysis (the relationship was analyzed between the "positional" factors and the agree—trust factor).

Why precisely do the "educators" demonstrate agreement with the media and trust in them? We feel that the issue is that the media, in carrying out the general social strategy of the administrative-bureaucratic system, constantly and on a mass basis—for decades!—in many variations have propagandized precisely the ideological approach to the posing, analysis and solution of diverse social problems. The political, socioeconomic, cultural and other reality has been interpreted by them most often as a certain status quo within which the solution to a majority of the social problems depended upon "each person in his place: his level of information, education and activeness" and so forth. Content analysis of the problem statements of the youth mass information media as carried out on the basis of the paradigmatic approach showed latent but objectively existing structures of texts which differed depending upon what elements of the paradigm are incorporated in them and

what are the relations between them. Thus, the problem of involving the youth in social administration and the problem of improving mutual understanding, contact and leisure of the youth is interpreted by the media in almost a diametrically opposite manner. While the first "is farmed off" to various social institutions, the latter is turned over to the individual and, as a rule, outside the limits of labor and sociopolitical activity. Such a division forms a very one-sided and far from innocent stereotype: the sphere of action of the social institutions is production and politics (here an individual person means little) while the sphere of action of the individual person is everyday life, leisure and human contact (social institutions do not bear direct responsibility for this). And content analysis has shown that under the conditions of glasnost, this situation has changed little. Understandably that portion of the audience in whom such an ideological position is dominant is characterized also by maximum agreement with and trust in the media.

From mass communications sociology and psychology, it is well known that the influence of the mass communications media assumes not only the acceptance of the proposed models of social reality but also active involvement of the audience in their formation. An analysis of the results of the poll disclosed at first glance a paradoxical fact in that the audience which did not agree and did not trust was characterized by increased activeness in the production of mass information. Thus, among those who did not agree there were almost 4-fold more of those who repeatedly sent letters to the editors of the media than there were among those who agreed, and among the mistrusters the figure was 2-fold greater than among the trusters. Clearly, this is explained by the fact that in contrast to the old audience groups which usually write to the editors in order to raise a socially significant problem or solve some specific question, the reason that the young men and women turn to the editors is more often a desire to voice their opinion and comment. At the same time, this shows that a certain portion of the audience which enters into a dialogue with the editors is prepared to defend its own alternative positions.

At first glance, the response by the editors to the action of a disagreeing audience is quite loyal: according to the data of both polls, the letters of usually disagreeing persons were published more frequently than the persons of the usually agreeing (the difference was 10-14 percent). But regardless of this, the disagreeing persons much more frequently than the agreeing ones (both in 1985 and in 1987) answered that the results of their letters to the editors in no way corresponded to their expectations (the difference in answers reached 15-25 percent (Table 2). What is the problem here? The answer is contained in the research data as it turned out that the media in fact create the most favored conditions for completely definite ideological positions and precisely for those who reinforce or continue their own. As a result of such an interaction between the media and their audience a curculius vitiosus is formed and beyond which remains primarily the disagreeing, mistrusting, that is,

"not our own" audience, including those readers, listeners and viewers who turned to the editors with their doubts and disagreements. Speaking to the essence, the more active contacts of the disagreeing youth with the media editors express not only a demand for self-realization and an unique challenge to traditional values, standards and rolls (which of course is not an exception), but also a demand for social orientation, adaptation to these values, standards and roles—as was shown, precisely this portion of the audience is the least socialized. Without finding the expected understanding and support, it disadapts and is desocialized even more. The disappointment caused by such attempts was eloquently expressed by one of the Soviet hippies, a rather numerous group of the disagreeing youth: "The more I knock on your door, the more I am convinced that you are home" [8]. Such attempts at contacts with the editors undoubtedly has a negative impact on the attitude toward the media as a whole as to a social institution with almost 1/3 of the persons disagreeing and almost 1/2 of the mistrusters feeling that the media express chiefly the opinion of leaders of varying level and not the opinion of the youth themselves; among those agreeing and trusting such an answer was given by only 6 percent (Table 2).

In this situation, the disagreeing youth was forced to seek out different, alternative information sources for the principles of reflecting social reality and interaction with the audience. One of these was interpersonal contact in the informal groups of peers. The Western radio was another, equally traditional (at least in terms of the present generation of youth) alternative information source. In recent years, the level of involvement of the youth in the sphere of influence of the Western radio has risen: according to the data of a 1985 poll, its broadcasts with a varying degree of regularity were listened to by 63 percent of the respondents, and in 1987, over 83 percent, while in 1985, a quarter of the listeners turned on their radios daily or several times a week while in 1987, the figure was already 44 percent. As for the trust of the audience in the media and the trust in the Western radio, these indicators disclosed a close negative linkage: a correlation coefficient  $r = -0.210$  with a confidence level of  $p = 0.001$ . Among those who usually do not trust the media there are almost 7-fold more than those who trust the Western radio.

Of course, one must not overlook that over the years of perestroika, fundamental changes have occurred in the activities of certain central and local media and the disagreement expressed by a portion of their audience has a completely different nature. However, at present under the conditions of the broadening glasnost and democratization, these friends are continuing to develop. For an answer to the question of why this is happening, we must turn to the third group of disagreement factors, that is, social reality itself.

For long years, the press, radio and TV in essence staged social reality, involving their readers, listeners and viewers in a spectacle of unprecedented scale. Although at that time a certain portion of the audience did not agree with the



media and did not trust them (according to the data of a representative poll conducted by us among the employed population of the republic in 1980, such answers were given by respectively 53.2 percent and 27 percent of the respondents), such an information-propaganda "background" to some degree became customary. After April 1985, many models of social reality which were constantly reproduced in the mass information in essence were repudiated. And, conversely, the models presented in the alternative sources to a certain degree gained official confirmation. Certainly, this could not help but influence the audience's attitude. This was the first thing. Secondly, although the glasnost level has noticeably risen, however the institution of glasnost and the related social relations have not as yet undergone any significant changes. It is no secret that in the Soviet Union virtually all the media are controlled by the authorities, chiefly the ruling party and not so much its elected bodies as the executive apparatus. In essence, the Soviet audience has been confronted with monolithic propaganda.

The functioning of the media under conditions of monopolistic propaganda inevitably led to the rise of the already described infamous circle in relations with the audience and beyond which remained chiefly those readers, listeners and viewers who did not share their position. In recent years, this process has not only not weakened, but, on the contrary, has intensified. There is one reason: glasnost has significantly broadened the opportunities for people to satisfy the demand for information, leaving unchanged their opportunity to freely express their own opinion. At the same time, the increased activeness and self-awareness of the Soviet people as well as the rise of the new independent public movements and associations have encouraged the development of precisely this demand of publically expressing and defending one's position. This demand was so strong and apparent that, without waiting for the old information-propaganda forms to assume a new content (that is, for a change in the operating principle of the media), new forms began to be created without preliminary arrangements. It is a question of the so-called parallel uncensored press. For example, in Belorussia alone, at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, a score such publications began to be published including NOVOSTI BELORUSSKOGO NARODNOGO FRONTA VOZROZHDENIYE, MARTIROLOG (a publication of the public historical-educational society for the memory of the victims of Stalinism "Martyrologist of Russia"), YEDINSTVO (a publication of the Confederation of Belorussian Youth Associations), BELORUSSKAYA TRIBUNA (an independent information bulletin), STUDENCHESKAYA MYSL (a sociopolitical and cultural journal of the student patriotic association Rassvet [Dawn]), KONTROL (the bulletin of the Society of Young Men of Letters Zdesnyye [Here]), NRAVSTVENNAYA MYSL (an independent journal of Orthodox youth) and others. All of them are published not by printing but usually by xerox and the run varies from 2,000 to 30,000, the volume of some runs up to two printer's sheets and the regularity of publishing averages once a month. No matter what political, economic and

ideological principles guide their publishers, in a situation of monopolistic propaganda the "parallel" press inevitably becomes an alternative and this certainly causes a negative response by the authorities. Thus, on 31 March, precisely when these publications began to gain a mass audience, particularly among the youth, the Presidium of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet adopted an Ukase according to which the preparation and distribution of uncensored publications was described as an administrative infraction [9]. Understandably, such "concern" for the "rights and legitimate interests of the citizens" does not encourage audience trust in the media which in addition more often endeavor to discredit unexpected competitors.

Thus, virtually all the examined criteria including the personal, informational factors and social reality itself—end up being closely linked and in their interaction encourage disagreement and mistrust of the media. The negative dynamics of the given process described at the outset of the article shows this.

The logic of the targeted approach to assessing the effectiveness of media suggests the following scientific-political assessment: the less socialized readers, listeners and viewers (the less adapted both to the existing social relations as well as to their depiction on the media) represent a "negative result" of mass communications and, consequently, efforts must be focused on "returning them to the bosom of the system." However, a whole series of the empirical facts already described above and disrupting this traditional logic has forced us to carry out an additional check on the main hypothesis of the research: to look at the social activeness and self-awareness of the audience through the prism of its agreement with and trust in the media. As the empirical indicators for activeness and self-awareness, we have used the following: participation of the respondents in the production of mass information, the consumption of information from alternative sources, leadership in the informal contact groups, sizes of home libraries, attitude toward the Law on Individual Labor Activity (as one of the tangible features of perestroika), an assessment of the distribution of social deviations in the youth milieu, the certainty of social self-assessment and discrepancies between the personal and social-standard relations.

The results of this check were not only unexpected but simply stunning. What in the course of the previous analysis had seemed a deviation from ordinary logic and a violation of a traditional interpretation developed into a clear, noncontradictory system of facts which had its own logic. Those who disagreed not only, as was already pointed out, turned more often than those who agreed with letters to the media editors, consumed information from other sources, and are leaders of informal groups, but also are much more interested in the Law on Individual Labor Activity, and have a clearer view of the real opportunities for their impact on various levels of the social structure. And most often it is a question not merely of significant differences of 5-10 percent but rather the differences of 2-3-fold. For many parameters



the disagreeing and mistrusting audience discloses a higher level of activeness and self-awareness or, in using the media language itself, greater moral-psychological readiness for perestroika than does the agreeing and trusting audience. Clearly, in light of this fact, a scientific-political assessment of the results and the prospects of audience disagreement with the media has assumed a completely different character. Certain scientists generally feel that a dose of alienation and an admixture of anomy are not only desirable but necessary and valuable in the modern world. Moreover, "the balance of 'positive' and 'negative' (from the viewpoint of the attitude of understanding toward the historical specific features of the given society) elements of social consciousness is an indispensable condition for the normal functioning of any society, the guarantee and simultaneously the indicator of its relative stability, one of the essential prerequisites for its maintaining of historical certainty" [10]. Under the conditions which provide the "negative" elements with the opportunity for self-realization, the development of these elements does not become dysfunctional and destructive. On the contrary, it makes the system more flexible, resistant and ultimately protects it from collapse. With such an understanding of the basic social function of mass communications, it becomes obvious that the presence of a disagreeing or, to put it more accurately, a "discordant" audience not only is not dysfunctional, but on the contrary characterizes the degree of freedom and openness in a society. For this reason, efforts must be directed not at returning the disagreeing to the bosom of the system but rather at changing the media structure and the very principles of mass communications in that direction in which the disagreement is developing (certainly with constitutionally fixed limitations which protect the social system against collapse). The model of a true democratic mass communications can be represented as a forum acceptable for all where each person can voice his opinion, as an unique information market, where there is a social exchange of knowledge, values and standards.

Of course, the transition from a monopolistic propaganda to such a model is a protracted and complex process which includes qualitative changes not only in the political system of society but also in social consciousness. In our view, this could be developed along two lines. In the first place, this is the democratization of the traditional, existing media system. Secondly, this is the development of parallel, independent media following the principle that each social principal which has the status of a legal entity has the right to its own publication (TV or radio program) and it bears full responsibility for its support.

In conclusion we would point out that the results obtained in the research and the conclusions drawn in principle do not repudiate the idea of the targeted approach to assessing the effectiveness of the media, but do introduce substantial adjustments in it. It "does not work" in a situation of monopolistic propaganda but "works" completely in a situation of pluralism. The

goals of some actively and freely working principals realize through their media are counterbalanced by the goals of other principals realized through other media. The disagreeing audience of one publication (program) is the agreeing one and actively supportive of the position of another. Thus, a mechanism of checks and balances is formed and this is one of the system-forming features of a democratic political system and the disagreeing audience is no longer interpreted as "deviant," as a potential or real principal of the counterculture, but rather as the principal in the culture of a democratic society.

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#### What Led to the Strike

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[Article by Lyudmila Lvovna Maltseva and Olga Nikolayevna Pulyayeva, sociologists working at the Kuznetskugol [Kuznetsk Coal] Concern (from the spring

of 1989, the Yuzhkuzbassugol [South Kuzbass Coal] Production Association in Novokuznetsk. This is the first time they are published in our journal]

#### From the Editors

[Text] In the January (1989) issue, the editors published materials from a roundtable entitled "Strikes in the USSR—New Social Reality" and thereby unsealed a previously securely "blocked" subject. Our article was exceptionally timely as the entire subsequent year was beset with mass strikes in the main coal basins of the nation. Over the last 18 months, the editorial "Portfolio" has built up many new interesting, although very heterogeneous articles on this problem and these we are offering now for our readers in the form of a thematic selection. In the materials published below we have attempted, wherever possible, to reflect both various aspects of the problem itself as well as the present level of its analysis by sociologists. Naturally, in the future, in receiving replies and new materials on the strikes, labor conflicts and generally on social tension in the production sphere, the editors leave to themselves the right to come back to the given question. The sixth issue is being published exactly a year after those events which are mentioned on its pages. It is not to be excluded that the summer of 1990 will be met by a new wave of worker struggle. This can be caused by the most diverse, at times unexpected reasons, so unstable and explosive is the situation now in society. Nevertheless we are hopeful that the efforts of the sociologists will not be in vain, for any increase in our knowledge about social conflicts, their sources, consequences and paths of resolution advances us toward general national consensus. [End of editorial note]

In the nation's coal basins, definite traditions have arisen and one of them is the mass choice of miner professions by the youth. The inhabitants of these regions are rather well acquainted with the difficulties and danger of mining jobs. In taking this step, each person is aware of what he is getting into. The decisive argument in the choice, aside from the objective factors, for example, the underdevelopment of other types of production on these territories, is the conviction that for the heavy, dangerous labor the level of material remuneration will be higher in comparison with the workers of other vocations. Such a notion until recently has been confirmed also by the fact that the miners lived in settlements, small towns or individual mining rayons of the cities. In actuality, in being in a homogeneous environment, the miners could not compare their wages with the earnings of other industrial workers. The wage

level of physicians, teachers and workers in the service sphere residing nearby was significantly lower than miner wages.

The flow of information in the period of perestroyka and glasnost has shown to the miners new examples of a level of material prosperity and this has provided food for comparison. This has led to a sharp reassessment of values. The real situation in the social sphere among the miners of the Yuzhkuzbassugol PO [Production Association] at the beginning of 1989 was as follows:

- In comparing the average wages of industrial-production personnel over the previous years (325 rubles for power workers, 340 rubles for metallurgical workers, 331 rubles for construction workers, 267 for machine builders and 400 for miners), we see that the difference is insignificant;
- The housing waiting list—11,800 families with 60,000 workers; thousands of people live in decrepit structures and barracks; an enormous waiting list for children's preschool institutions (over 6,000; the medical facilities are in a neglected state);
- Each day over 3,000 workers of the association do not show up for work due to sickness the reason for which is the unsatisfactory working conditions and production services. During the year 20 persons died at the association's enterprises and 1,500 were injured.

Thus, the knowledge by the miners of their job at present has become more accurate and adequate to the real state of affairs. In this context, what problems concern the miners?

A poll was conducted during the period of the first refusals to work, the so-called temporary work stoppages, that is, 3 months prior to the general strike of the Kuzbass miners. The choice of the mines was caused by their typicalness: the Rapsadskaya Mine (Mezhdurechensk) which stably operates well, the Mine imeni 60-Letiye SSSR (the settlement of Malinovka) which operates on an average basis and Baydayevskaya Mine (Novokuznetsk) which operates extremely unrhythmically (n = 1,500 persons).

An analysis of miner satisfaction with production and social working conditions has shown that the housing problem is most acute and here the dissatisfaction indexes have reached critical values (see Table 1). This problem is common to the workers and to the ITR [engineer and technical workers] and does not depend either upon the results of mine operations or upon the territorial location of the mines. Dissatisfaction with food is also general.

**Table 1: Satisfaction of Workers and ITR With Social and Production Factors**

Elements of Production Situation	Satisfaction Indexes (from +1 to -1)					
	Mine imeni 60-Letiye SSSR		Raspadskaya Mine		Baydayevskaya Mine	
	Workers	ITR Workers	Workers	ITR Workers	Workers	ITR Workers
Possibility of improving housing conditions	-0.77	-0.17	-0.67	-0.21	-0.0.69	-0.63
Wages	-0.57	0.25	-0.51	0.03	-0.53	-0.39
Bonus system	-0.65	0.16	-0.53	0.07	-0.47	-0.29
Supply of tools and equipment	-0.53	—	-0.35	—	-0.55	—
Organization of labor	-0.54	0.10	-0.24	0.11	-0.37	-0.14
Working conditions	-0.37	0.03	-0.34	0.10	-0.36	-0.21
Labor safety	0.23	—	0.13	—	0.09	—
Meals at mine	-0.52	-0.40	-0.48	-0.70	-0.40	-0.67
Work as whole	—	-0.49	0.13	0.39	-0.30	0.18

In second place among the workers are factors related to wages. The worker dissatisfaction level with wages is the same at all mines, that is, does not depend upon the stability of their operation. To a significant degree the organization and norming of labor, material-technical supply and working conditions are reflected in the wage level of the workers.

The workers are very sensitive to the questions of wages and material incentives. Only 11.6 percent of them feel that their wages correspond to the work performed while 69 percent of those questioned felt that wages were lower. In their opinion, the various type of repair jobs were not fully paid for, the complex mining and geological conditions and flooding were not always considered and schedules were not drawn up for certain fulfilled jobs.

In comparing their standard of living with the standard of living of workers in other national economic sectors, only 4 percent of the questioned workers felt that the wages were much higher for miners, a little higher for 18 percent, the same for 23 percent and one out of four miners found it difficult to compare the standard of living of the miners and

workers from other sectors. At present, the miners are beginning to relate differently to compensation for the difficulty and danger of miner labor.

Initially only workers from individual subdivisions of basic production expressed their dissatisfaction. The first demands which were made by the workers were purely economic and directed directly to the management. For comparison (as a standard) they pointed to the situation of the "regular" pacesetters who are supplied first with a clear organization of labor (the preparation and prompt opening up of a clearing front), new equipment, equipment repairs, the unloading of coal, and this raises the wage level for the "pacesetters" by 1.5-3-fold above that of the workers of other brigades at the same mine. Such a situation of "regular" pacesetters has long caused valid dissatisfaction, leading to stratification among the workers themselves. In this regard, the degree of satisfaction with labor factors of the "regular" pacesetters (Sections 6, 13) is significantly higher than among those who "temporarily" have halted work (Sections 8, 19) as well as the workers of other brigades having average indicators of work efficiency (Sections 2, 5; Table 2).

**Table 2: Satisfaction of Workers From Different Sectors With Factors of Their Labor**

	Satisfaction Indexes (from +1 to -1)					
	Mine imeni 60-Letiye SSSR		Raspadskaya Mine		Baydayevskaya Mine	
	Sections					
Elements of Production Association	No 2	No 8	No 13	No 19	No 5	No 6
Wages	-0.33	-0.76	-0.25	-0.82	-0.62	-0.07
Bonus system	-0.47	-0.80	-0.28	-0.83	-0.57	-0.05
State of equipment	-0.10	-0.10	0.30	-0.61	-0.43	0.03
Equipment repair	0.16	-0.16	0.26	-0.58	-0.48	0.18
Wage level in fulfilling plan	-0.35	-0.72	-0.25	-0.59	-0.65	-0.07
Resolving disputed questions with administration	0.03	-0.63	-0.20	-0.58	-0.28	-0.07



In addition, stratification occurs within the integrated brigades themselves, where the established structure of professions does not correspond to the brigade form of the organization of labor which combines interchangeability and the combining of professions. Relations between workers are also aggravated by the existing rate-skill scale of professions and the bonus system. For example, because of this a conflict arose between the workers at Section No 8 of the Mine imeni 60-Letiye SSSR. The workers of this section represented the basic underground professions: the miners of the stoping face (GROZ), the cutters and the electricians who service all the equipment of the section. For the GROZ and the cutters there are piece wages, while the electricians have time wages. Moreover, for each profession a varying maximum bonus percentage has been set: 70 percent for the GROZ and the cutters and 45 percent for the electricians and it was over this that the conflict arose. In endeavoring to restore justice, the electricians achieved the setting of the same bonus percentage as the GROZ, persuading the management that the complexity and danger of their job had already been considered in the piece and time wages.

From the results of a poll, the workers of the main professions (miners and cutters) were most dissatisfied with the elements of the production situation, in comparison with workers of other professions. This fact largely explains the situation existing today at the mines, where with overall surplus numbers they lack precisely workers of the main professions and particularly cutters.

In April, in their demands the workers sought a solution to the problems directly concerning their collectives: an improvement and prompt supply of tools, special clothing and individual protective gear, additional payments for carrying out certain amounts of work (a job payment), payment for work in the evening and at night and so forth. In a number of instances, the miners expressed mistrust of the section chiefs, the chiefs of the departments of labor and wages, the first leaders of the mines, the labor collective councils and the trade union committees.

A mine is a very complex mechanism and the miners, working under dangerous conditions, are very sensitive to insults and injustice. Thus, the attempts of the workers to compare their labor and wages with the labor of the ITR and their wages led to the rise of tension in relations. The workers see the basic purpose of the ITR and leaders in ensuring a precise organization of production and the mechanization of labor. However, in their opinion, a large portion of the ITR (particularly of the functional departments and services) had failed to meet this assignment and this told substantially on the results of worker labor. At the same time, the wage level of the ITR is always higher than for the workers and this was seen negatively by the latter

with the nonfulfillment of the plan by the sections. At the time of the poll, tension in the relations of the workers and ITR had reached a maximum and had actual terms develop into a confrontation.

An essential condition for efficient management of labor activity is a real knowledge of the labor motivation of the workers and a knowledge of the needs and interests which they endeavor to satisfy in the production sphere. In studying the ITR attitude toward labor, it became clear that the intensity of the inner motivation for them was very low (0.12 with a maximum of 1.0) and several-fold lower than the intensity of external incentives (0.6-0.7) which is the basic one. The external incentives consist in stimuli which lie outside the limits of labor as such and include earnings, the fear of condemnation, promotion, material incentives and so forth (Table 3).

**Table 3: Structure of Values of Life for Workers and ITR Ranked According to Degree of Importance for Respondent**

Very Important for Oneself	Rank	
	Workers	ITR
Material prosperity	1	1
Family prosperity	2	2
Justice	3	—
Respective comrades, authority	4	3
Free time	5	4
Interesting job	6	5
Active participation in mine affairs	7	7
Desire to increase education, improve skill	8	6
Promotion in service	9	8

As is seen from it, at the center of the interests of the workers and ITR is not professional activity but rather family and domestic considerations. Substantial differences were not apparent in the labor motivation of workers from different sociodemographic and professional groups.

The demand for justice for the workers is one of the most urgent. Into this concept they usually invest equal organization of labor and wages, the distribution of various benefits and moral incentives. With age, the desire for adequate moral encouragement rises and in the structure of demands expels from first place material well-being and family prosperity, but is very little realized in the production sphere, and this was reflected in the low assessment of the activities of the social organizations directly responsible for this aspect of assessing the labor of the employees (Table 4).



**Table 4: Worker Satisfaction With Activities of Mine Public Institutions**

Public Institutions	Satisfaction Indexes (from +1 to -1)		
	Mine imeni 60-Letiye SSSR	Raspadsкая Mine	Baydayevskaya Mine
Party committee	-0.21	-0.31	-0.22
Trade union committee	-0.30	-0.48	-0.13
Komsomol committee	-0.37	-0.40	-0.28
Labor collective council	0.01	0.01	0.01

Characteristically, worker dissatisfaction with the activities of the trade union committees and party committees was found at all mines and the opinion about the work of the labor collective council (these began to be organized at the coal industry enterprises only as of January 1989) had still not been formed. In situations of "temporary" work stoppages, one could clearly see the inability of the public organizations (primarily the trade union) to represent worker interests, to conduct talks with the management and achieve solutions satisfying to both sides. In the opinion of the workers, one other reason for the "temporary" work stoppages was the desire to force the managers to show serious attention to the acute miner problems. For now these have been isolated actions by the workers and they have not been widely supported among the remaining workers, although they were not condemned. However, the importance of these actions is great as precisely they formulated clear ideas about creating the workers' own independent organizations capable of defending their interests. Two months remained until the general strike of the Kuzbass miners....

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### Strikes at Enterprises From Worker Standpoint

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press 28 Apr 90) pp 42-48

[Article by Viktor Grigoryevich Britvin, doctor of philosophical sciences and leader of the Center for the Study of Public Opinion of the Sociology Institute Under the USSR Academy of Sciences. He has repeatedly been published in our journal]

[Text] Official science until recently has categorically rejected any possibility whatsoever of strikes in Soviet society as a mass social action, since in its interpretation a strike is nothing more than a form of worker protest against economic and political suppression under capitalism, and as a manifestation of antagonistic contradictions inherent "exclusively" to bourgeois society.

The historical experience of our nation would seemingly confirm the unshakability of this notion. If one does not consider individual instances, labor disputes, including collective ones, as a rule, were sporadic and brief and basically concerned specific organizational problems and did not require the intervention of any superior levels for resolving them. The conciliatory actions of the economic leaders and the local trade union committees more often were sufficient to prevent an unfavorable development of events with severe economic, political and moral costs, to remove the crux of the problem which cause the labor conflict and successfully overcome a drawing out of the conflict itself.

In theory, everything was logical and noncontradictory. Public ownership of the means of production, that is, the unified economic base, made it possible to also postulate a unity of interests among the various principals in production, the laborer, the collective and society. Deviations from the theoretical scheme were disregarded as it was felt without detriment to an analysis of the social situation and the elaboration of a managerial strategy and for this reason in the economic, political and sociological lexicon there were not even any hints about strikes let alone any arguments about the right of workers to hold them. Strikes at a Soviet enterprise were viewed as an abstract possibility or, more precisely, as an impossibility. Any conflict was declared an accident or the result of intrigues, sabotage and diversion by subversive forces. For this reason, the very problem of the labor conflict was posed and solved as a purely internal organizational question representing the clash of opposite-directed actions by the workers and caused by a divergence of interests, values and standards of conduct [1, p 232].

Precisely such internal organizational conflicts—intergroup or interpersonal, psychological, sociopsychological or economic—localized to the zone of the enterprise (organization) attracted the attention of the researchers.

The reality of recent years has, however, been richer than these stereotypes. The wave of miner strikes which swept across the nation has shown that the previously strictly limited activity of the labor collectives had gone far beyond the established limits of the typical forms of their life activity. Spontaneous strikes were also noted in many enterprises of other sectors in virtually all regions of the nation.

Mass consciousness responded to the situation arising in the nation in a more or less uniform manner. According to the data of our research conducted in a typical industrial region, only 1/5 of those questioned responded negatively about the strikes, in pointing to their absolute inadmissibility.<sup>1</sup> The opposite opinion was held by 1/2 the number of respondents (1 out of 11), considering it

possible to go on strike with any deviation by the management from the collective contract or the conditions of the labor agreement. Over 1/2 of those questioned (55 percent) considered it admissible to strike only with major violations of the collective contract or the labor agreement by management. Around 14 percent did not define their attitude on this question. The greatest radicalism of views was found among the workers and among them the share of those approving of a strike with any deviations from the collective contract or labor agreement was twice the amount than among the engineer and technical workers [ITR]. There were almost as many fold less among those who rejected a strike as a means of resolving a conflict. The leaders of the labor collectives were more intolerant of strikes. While among the regular workers 17 percent of those questioned uniformly rejected strikes, with a rise in the level of the job hierarchy, the share of supporters of a ban on strikes rises, reaching 23 percent among the brigade leaders, foremen and section chiefs, 27 percent among the heads of departments, chiefs of shops and their deputies and 35 percent of the representatives of the corresponding category of workers among the leaders of the enterprises (organizations, institutions).

With sufficient certainty it can be assumed that the current strikes on the job have been caused at least by two interrelated groups of factors. The first mediates the influence of the macroprocesses occurring in society while the second is formed by elements of the production (labor) situation. For this reason, regardless that the occurring conflicts had an economic cast, in their content and even more in their consequences they assumed a political character. The highest echelons of economic and state administration were drawn into the conflict, and the path for resolving it was not always clear even for the very conflicting sides and this probably was explained by the lack of appropriate experience. Quite naturally, even on the threshold of the unprecedented disruptions in society because of the strikes in a basic sector of industry, one could encounter assertions similar to the one quoted below: "strikes under socialism in essence are devoid of both an immediate (improvement in standard of living) as well as long-range strategic perspective (change in the social order)... The solution to the question is in developing democratic mechanisms for smoothing out labor conflicts and a dialogue and mutually advantageous compromise" [2, pp 25-26].

Undoubtedly, the elaboration of an effective mechanism for resolving labor conflicts, particularly in a situation of the extremely high degree of social tension, is urgently necessary. However, this mechanism will operate all the more successfully the more precisely it takes into account the reasons for the strike, the motives and orientation of their participants and the possible consequences of their development—economic and political—which can end in fundamental changes in all structures of society. Events in the Eastern European countries confirm this. The essence of the changes which occurred there is such that it would not be correct to

qualify the direction and particularly the result of these changes as a renewal of socialism (or renewed socialism). The processes in our country also provide equal ground for reflection, including the strikes as the evolution of these has entailed a change in the aims of the strikers as a consequence of their ever-clearer realization and adjustment, proceeding from the existing social situation.

Strikes quite often assume the form of a conflict that is not only economic but also political.<sup>2</sup> As is known, the strike committee in the Kuzbass in the summer of 1989 proposed, for example, the slogan of canceling benefits and privileges to any officials and also the immediate submission to nationwide discussion of the new USSR Constitution and its adoption no later than 7 November 1990. That these demands reflect not only local attitudes but have beneath them a broad social base can be seen from the fact that 3/4 of the workers questioned favored the cancellation of benefits with only 1 out of 11 against; some 58 percent were in favor of an immediate nationwide discussion of the new Constitution and 1 out of 12 was against. Many also favored the legislative enforcement of the right of the workers to strike for both economic and political reasons (39 percent), and this was twice the number of persons who agreed with the restricting of the right to strike solely to economic limits.

In analyzing the experience of the strike movement in the last 2 years of perestroika, it is not difficult to trace how easily conflicts over relatively particular questions of wages, working conditions or supply can grow into a problem touching on the very stability of the institutions of power. The elimination of the soviet, party and trade union administrative bodies on the spot by the strike committees which actually took power in their own hands is rather persuasive proof of the direction in the evolution of striker demands. And their emergence into a direct conflict with the government should forewarn the extreme consequences of the strike struggle.

The increased social awareness has also touched the forms of management and the existing institutions of democracy in production.

The economic independence of the enterprises and the rights to select the forms of their economic existence have become a matter of acute contradiction and conflict. While recently the most essential aspect of the democratization of production was seen in the electing of leaders, now we are beginning to realize that of incomparably greater significance, from the viewpoint of emerging from the profound economic crisis, is the free choice by the labor collectives of the forms of management and ownership.

In line with this one cannot help but note the following circumstance. It is possible to encounter the assertion that the evident orientation to the market has given rise to the strikes. Here it is correctly pointed out that previously we did not have strikes or in any event there were many fewer than now. And it is not surprising as

under the conditions of the unchallenged dominance of the administrative-command system the strikes were viewed as a revolt with all the ensuing consequences. But from this it in no way follows that the strikes were caused precisely by the attempts at initiating market relations. The events of recent months have completely repudiated this argument. The Vorkuta strikers as one of the main points raised the demand of economic independence for the mines and autonomy from the local "monopoly" the Vorkutaugol [Vorkuta Coal] Production Association. Another example is the clash between the USSR Ministry of Coal Industry and the collective at the Kuzbass Raskpaskaya Mine which threatens new cataclysms; the miners have again demanded independence but have clashed with the administrative stubbornness of the department. The conflict, as is known, ended with the turning over of the mine as a lease to the labor collective. The leased fixed capital is around 180 million rubles. This argues rather in favor than against the fact that economic development on the basis of cost accounting and market relations is not merely the idle notion of the "marketeers" but rather a concern conforming to the interests of the broad masses of workers and for which the people are ready to struggle and endure hardships.

The verbally expressed orientation and practical steps by the strikers to satisfy the valid claims to independent economic operations indicate that under the conditions of reduced efficiency from the efforts by the central administrative bodies to stabilize the improve the economic situation in the nation, the actual gaining of the right to economic independence has been the most dependable means for ensuring more or less favorable prerequisites for the existence of the labor collectives.

The crisis in the economy, the tension in the political sphere and the flaws in the social one creates permanent objective factors which entail danger for all society. In the deformed macrosphere, any, even the most significant fact, event or phenomenon in social life, any element in the production situation can become the detonator of a conflict and "convert" it into a strike. In the course of our research it was established that around a quarter of those questioned consider as characteristic for their collective injustice in the assessment of labor, persecution for criticism as a widespread phenomenon, and the promotion of others to leading positions not out of personal accomplishments but by acquaintanceship. Approximately 1/2 of those questioned noted the appearances of bureaucracy, formalism and an indifferent attitude toward the regular workers. Less than 10 percent of those questioned voiced satisfaction with the quality of food, the distribution of housing, service facilities at the enterprise and the operation of transport.

The ongoing deformations in the social situation even in better times for our economy has made it improbable for the quick elimination of them in the near future and this inevitably will be reflected even more in the authority of the governing powers and which are being subjected to serious criticism and pressure from the broad masses of

workers. A possible scenario for the development of events was in essence suggested by the summer miner actions.

It can be said that a redistribution of local power has been the result of the previous strikes. The disturbances have even reached the sectorial level of management. Strike (worker) committees functioning both at individual enterprises or associations as well as in the regions have emerged in the forefront.

The strikers in practice have brought together economic, administrative and political functions and with exceptional effectiveness. If one speaks about the strike committees as parallel or alternative institutions of power at the enterprises, they have won the trust of the workers. Confirmation of their great authority is the mass nature of the strikes, their organization, duration and the support which they have been given by the workers of enterprises which have refrained from striking. Let us turn to the assessments of the effectiveness of the main bodies of production democracy from the viewpoint of their exercising of a protective function. The poll was conducted among those who did not participate in the strikes.

In assessing the possibility of most fully and competently representing the interests of the labor collective in the course of resolving a collective labor conflict, 34 percent of those questioned (and let us repeat again that these as yet did not have direct participation in the strike struggle) preferred the labor collective council and 22 percent of the respondents favored either the trade union or the strike committees.

Also high was the authority of the new leaders, the leaders of the strike committees who had arisen in the course of the strikes. One-half of those questioned supported the opinion that these were persons representing the broad strata of the workers, who knew the needs and concerns of the regular workers and were concerned for them. Just 10 percent of the respondents described the strike leaders as persons who under the slogans of democracy and concern for others were pursuing their own personal aims while only 5 percent considered them as persons who consciously were creating disorder or instigating disorder.

A comparison of the given numbers clearly shows the prevailing positive image in mass consciousness of the strike leader and considering the 32 percent of those vacillating in their reply, the share of those who are drawn to the strike committees and their leaders can be even higher.

An analysis of the given research discloses one other aspect which is extremely important for a correct assessment of the developing labor relations and this is the obvious discrepancy in the replies of the entire contingent of questioned workers and the trade-union aktiv taken separately. The representatives of the latter, in comparing the above-mentioned bodies of production democracy from the viewpoint of their ability to defend



the interests of the workers, in their mass prefer the trade union committees (69 percent), with 15 percent pointing to the labor collective council and 10 percent to the strike committee. The conclusion is obvious: the trade union aktiv has inadequately perceived the situation arising with the appearance of new real competitors.

Research has shown that only 1/5 of those questioned considers as sufficient the attention given by the trade unions to the questions of production development, to defending the interests and rights of the workers, improving working and service conditions, although certain positive shifts from the viewpoint of the turning of the trade union organizations toward the carrying out of a protective function by them, have been pointed out by almost 1/2 of those questioned (45 percent).

A comparative analysis of the replies from the overall mass of workers and the trade union aktiv again discloses substantial discrepancies in the standpoints of one or another group. The opinions of the aktiv are sharply skewed toward optimistic views. Some 82 percent of the aktiv pointed to an improvement in the situation to one degree or another, while 12 percent felt that nothing had changed and only 3 percent of the activists felt that influence has lessened. Equally noticeable discrepancies were found in the distribution of answers to the question on the real strength of the trade union committees. In a situation when the trade unions must overcome their dependence upon the administration and party bodies with which they constantly interact and frequently duplicate, completely valid is the question of whether "the protector himself is sufficiently protected" (that is, the trade union committee or its leader) against outside pressure in order in an active but most importantly effective manner to resolve the problems confronting them?

Practice provides a multiplicity of examples of poor protection of the trade union organizations against the arbitrariness of management. That the question has matured can be seen by the full agreement expressed by 55 percent of those questioned with the need to raise the protection for the representatives of the trade union bodies. About 20 percent of the workers agree with this only partially and just 4 percent do not agree at all.

A new element in the present-day economic and political situation is that in society, even agonizingly, the inevitability is recognized of returning to patterns of efficient management which demand, among other things, the elimination of the loss enterprises. According to the data of one of the studies carried out by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion together with the Department of Sociological Problems of Propaganda under the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 62 percent of those questioned agreed with the necessity to close down enterprises which for a protracted time had operated at a loss. Around 19 percent replied "no" and 18 percent found it difficult to answer. Seemingly a positive fact.

The mass of people understand the importance of reorienting the economy to efficient management methods. However, we must not underestimate the existing feeling of social protection or more precisely "state intercession" and the paradoxically related parasitic attitudes (the blame for which, incidentally, rests primarily on the prevailing ideology which has frequently ended up being merely phraseology which fosters illusions). All the more as the replies characterizing the opinions concerning the subjects and methods of resolving the problem of job placement for let-go workers in eliminating the bankrupt enterprises are very indicative. Eight out of every 10 of those questioned felt that in the event of closing down loss-operating enterprises, the state should find jobs for "those out of work." Conversely, just 11 percent felt that the problem of finding jobs was an undertaking for the persons let go themselves.

Such conviction of the people in the obligations of the authorities to guarantee their fate in any socioeconomic cataclysms merely intensifies the bitterness and sharpness of disappointment in clashing with reality (actually, an independent solution to the problem of finding their own job in a situation of the noticeable harsh competition on the labor market). The significance of the forecasted number of employees to be released over the next decade, on the one hand, and the shortened time in the Law on a Socialist State Enterprise provided to the discharged worker for finding a job, on the other, are merely capable of exacerbating conflicts in society as a consequence of the appearance and rapid growth of a reserve labor army. This prospect is real and dangerous, particularly for zones of heightened social tension, including the labor-surplus regions and territories with a bad ecological situation, with an underdeveloped social infrastructure and so forth. The collective conflicts which now and again develop into mass strikes are the most probable result of the development of such events. And one can only hazard a guess as to how in the new situation the ratio of persons approving and disapproving the strikes, trade unions, strike committees, bankruptcies and so forth will shift.

In conclusion we would point out that strikes, having become a reality of our life, have exacerbated the already complex economic and political situation. The intellectual, moral, economic and political experience gained by the workers will have far-reaching consequences. From the difficult clash with virtually all institutions of power the strikers, their leading bodies and leaders have emerged socially strengthened, united, organized, feeling their own power which cannot help but be considered.

The most important results of the summer strikes have been apparent in several regards. In economic terms, they with all the inevitable costs have shown enormous potential from the viewpoint of developing the economic reform. In political terms, they have become the starting point for forming a true worker movement, creating independent and, what is particularly important, effective management structures capable of becoming dominant among the traditional power structures. "There is



no bad without good." The trade unions, finally, have begun to more clearly define their position as the carriers of the protective function vis-a-vis the workers. To turn this insight into a substantial advantage for themselves will certainly not be easy since a majority of workers has had their confidence in them shaken. The establishing of parallel or alternative structures (informal trade unions, strike committees) which have been in the vanguard of the striking worker detachments have further encouraged a decline in the prestige of the official trade unions.

A change in the situation is scarcely possible without major alterations. The postulate which predominated for many years of the biune function of the trade unions of assisting in fulfilling the production plans and defending the interests and rights of the workers, as expressing the ideology of the etatization of the trade unions and turning them into an element of the command-administrative management system should be revised. The official trade unions will clearly lose their significance and role in the future as the alternative, parallel and independent trade unions arise. The appearance of independent organizations is affirmation that the compromising stance of the trade unions has been defeated.

Just how insurmountable will be the difficulties confronting the trade unions on this path will be largely determined by the readiness and the ability of the trade union apparatus to overcome the established stereotypes and inflated views of their own role and capabilities. The image which the trade union aktiv sees in the mirror only very approximately corresponds to the one presented to the outside observer, that is, the workers themselves.

#### Footnotes

1. The poll was conducted in Volgograd and Volgograd Oblast in October-November 1989. The object of the research was the adult population (employed in the national economy). A total of 2,000 persons were questioned. In addition, 123 representatives of the trade union aktiv and 20 experts were questioned. A representative sample was not envisaged.

2. We do not have in mind the strikes which from the very outset had a political nature as a means for resolving interethnic problems.

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#### Kuzbass Worker Committees

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[Article by Galina Vladimirovna Kubas, sociologist from the city of Kemerovo and student at the Higher Sociological Courses Under the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] In Soviet social sciences for a long time the viewpoint has prevailed that with the victory of a socialist revolution and the construction of socialism, the working class in the USSR would not have its own goals and tasks which differed from the other strata of society and, consequently, the classic methods for worker struggle are inapplicable in resolving the arising social problems.

The real events in the summer of 1989—the miner strikes in virtually all the nation's coal basins—not only repudiated such convictions but also showed just how great was the potential of the working class. At the same time, in Soviet science there is actually no theory for the development of the worker movement under the conditions of socialism. Its elaboration must be preceded by a careful analysis of the real course of events and the existing forms of worker organization.

Before examining the activities of the Kuzbass worker committees, it would be advisable, in our view, to study their structure and functions and the dynamics of the personnel.

Arising spontaneously in the Kuzbass coal enterprises, the strike movement disclosed a whole series of worker leaders capable of effectively defending the interests of the workers. At conferences and meetings of the collectives, the strike committees were organized and these were granted all power within the enterprise. Rayon and city strike committees were organized in an analogous manner. Without having any formal power, the committees began to exercise actual complete control over the situation, drawing into the sphere of their influence all aspects of the activities of the cities and settlements. On the very 5th day of the strike in the town of Prokopyevsk an united strike committee was elected. Subsequently, it was renamed the regional worker council of Kuzbass committees with the status of a public organization. Thus, its powers were legitimized and two main tasks were set: the greatest possible development of economic perestroika in the nation as well as assisting in realizing an agreement with the government and supervising its fulfillment.

In terms of their scale the two proposed tasks are completely different. As a result, it is very difficult to isolate that sphere in which one must put the activities of the worker committees. Moreover, the council, according to a provision concerning its status, should coordinate the actions of the rayon and city committees,

defend the socioeconomic rights of the council members, carry out constant work to handle the complaints and statements of the workers, and at times intervene quickly in some specific event. The statement by the Chairman of the oblispolkom A.F. Lyutenko on the actual presence of dual power in the oblast was a recognition that all the designated functions were actively being realized under the existing conditions [1].

Initially (on 17 July), the membership of the regional council included 27 persons representing the 12 main coal mining centers of the oblast. On the basis of the decisions of the labor collective councils the average monthly wage and former place of employment were kept for the member of the worker committee. As a total considering the movement of the personnel, some 37 persons were elected to the membership of the regional council over the 4 months, and of these 12 were constantly employed from 17 July to the end of November. What were the reasons for leaving the council?

According to the data obtained on 21 November 1989 from 3 leading members of the regional council, the following was disclosed: of the 37 members, 6 persons had been recalled by the STK [labor collective council]; 6 had left spontaneously without visible reasons; 3 had been recalled and replaced by the city workers. Thus, out of the total council membership over the 4 months, 17 persons had dropped out and this was 46 percent of the elected.

It is possible to note certain particular features in the change of the membership of the regional council. For example, the most stable was the group with a specialized secondary and higher education. Of the 9 persons with VUZ diplomas elected in July, 6 (67 percent) continued working until the end of November, while for those with a specialized secondary education it was 3 out of 5 (60 percent), while at the same time of the persons having a 10th-grade education, including the GPTU [state vocational-technical school], just 2 out of the 11 remained (18 percent). In our view, this is explained by a number of factors and first of all by the greater complexity of the tasks confronting the council of worker committees as well as by the better preparation to solve them for persons having a higher educational level. Clearly enthusiasm, determination and desire alone were not sufficient. Also noticeable were changes in the council membership by age with a general trend for the youth to leave the worker movement.

The strike (worker) committees were established in the Kuzbass mines not only as bodies for maintaining public order and for settling the processes of life support for the strikers and the entire population of the oblast, but chiefly for expressing and defending the demands of the workers raised in the course of the strike. The result of talks between the government commission and the regional strike (worker) committee was the signing on 18 July of the joint "Protocol Upon Approved Measures to Carry Out the Demands of the Strikers."

A larger portion of the long-range measures incorporated in the Protocol extended to all the enterprises of the Ministry of Coal Industry and is to be settled exclusively by the central authorities. Among the urgent points are those the fulfillment date of which should not exceed 3 months. In analyzing the Protocol, we see that more than 80 percent of the points requiring centralized financing concern emergency measures and a significant portion of them (over 75 percent) are involved with purely economic ones. With the existing financial difficulties, it can be assumed that the given measures were approved more as a political maneuver and as an attempt to more quickly dampen the arising conflict than as a balance decision backed up by the possibility of quickly achieving its fulfillment.

The grounds for such an assumption was also the fact that by the times when these lines were being written, the date set for the implementation of the emergency measures was already passed. However, a significant portion of the demands had not been met. According to the oblispolkom data "... of the 43 points adopted for execution, 20 had been carried out, 9 were in the works and 14 points had been forwarded for resolution by the government...." [2]; according to the data of the CPSU obkom "...of the 43 points, 23 had been carried out..., and for 12 the questions had been forwarded to superior bodies for decision..." [3]. Finally, according to information of the regional council of the Kuzbass worker committees, 11 of the 44 points had been carried out and 17 which were of primary significance for the region had not been carried out at all [4].

Considering this, let us examine the relations of the worker committees with the official power structures and the public organizations of varying level. It is possible to speak about a real balance of forces between them at present only with certain stipulations. Let us take up this in greater detail. An indirect indicator of a society's political stability, along with other factors, is, in our view, the degree of trust shown by the population in the traditional power structures in resolving various problems. As a result of research carried out immediately after the strike by co-workers of the VTsIOM [All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion], an absolute advantage from the viewpoint of the trust of the strike members had been gained precisely by the worker (strike) committees. As a whole, they were given over 80 percent of the votes, while the traditional power structures received only 11 percent and the people's deputies a little more than 12 percent [5, pp 7-8].

At present, the activities of the worker committees on the spot and the regional council, according to all appearances, have become less widespread in comparison with July 1989, when the official authorities simply could not control the situation in the oblast cities. "...All nonoperating and operating enterprises obeyed only the strike committee, order on the streets was maintained by worker pickets...and by their power the committees were not only to prevent the operation of entire enterprises but also prevent them not to work and under strike

conditions this is doubly difficult" [6]. However, as experience was gained, the decisions became ever-sounder and more balanced. The very fact that after 4 months since the end of the strike the organ of the strike movement has continued to operate and exercise control over the fulfillment of the Protocol and has maintained authority among the workers is of enormous significance.

The wave of mass strikes which by 17 July involved 158 enterprises in the Kuzbass with a total number of employees of 177,682 persons [7] and marked the rise and development of the worker movement in the nation caused a varying response both among the public as well as among all ranks of party soviet and economic leaders of the oblast. The economic bodies in the form of territorial associations became the fervid opponents of the strikers. This was felt in the course of the strike and particularly after it. The influence of the production associations was particularly strong in the cities of the region where their managerial structures were concentrated. Having felt in the worker committees a real force and fearing the categorical nature of the demands to eliminate this element of the economic administration, the production associations were the first to seek out an opportunity to provide help to the worker committees in the form of transport, duplicating equipment and finances. However, since the point of reorganizing the associations was not removed in the demands of the miners and in addition in the course of the struggle for economic independence, it assumed particular significance, from temporary allies the apparatus of the associations, in abandoning the support of the strikers, turned into the initiator and executor of the most conservative decisions. Repeated attempts were made to disrupt the activities of the worker committees. The leaders of the worker movement, for example, were offered leading positions in the associations. Clearly in the existing system of sectorial management, even a radically inclined leader could not work successfully without losing the trust of the workers. So, the latter correctly viewed these proposals as an attempt to buy off and create a worker aristocracy, an attempt to split the movement. A different situation arose in those regions where there were no administrations of the territorial coal associations. Here the party gorkoms and the gorispolkoms saw in the worker committees precisely that force which was capable of influencing the economic bodies and, as a consequence, could resolve a portion of the most urgent problems in these regions and cities.

Nevertheless, a consolidation of the antistrike and anti-perestroika forces became the response to the demand for political changes (for early elections to the local soviets, the re-election of a number of party leaders and so forth). All possible methods were employed of direct and indirect pressure on the participants in the strike movement. Thus, in the town of Belovo, the communists and the members of the city worker committee, in their words, were offered a choice: either to join the Union of Kuzbass workers or keep their membership in the CPSU.

This occurred in October-November, when the very actions of the miners and the demands put forward by them had long been officially recognized as legitimate.

During an interview with 7 members of the council, it became clear that both during and after the strike, regardless of the unusual situation, virtually no differences of opinion were observed in the positions of the party and soviet bodies on the spot. This indicates that the party bodies provided actual coordination for the actions of all strike opponents while the soviets, correspondingly, again showed a lack of their own opinion.

In actual terms, all persons questioned mentioned the central ministries and departments as the main opponents in carrying out the basic points of the Protocol (concerning regional cost accounting and independence of the enterprises). On the territory of Kemerovo Oblast, 93 percent of the enterprises and associations are under Union and republic subordination. In carrying out a "colonial" policy to extract resources from the Kuzbass, the central apparatus was least concerned with developing the social infrastructure. The demand to restore justice encountered active resistance. The statement by the Minister of Coal Industry M.I. Shchadov that from 16 October 1989 they would cease to pay the full-time members of the worker committees "...we do not have the right to remove them but we will no longer pay them" [7] was viewed precisely in this manner in the oblast. The oblast council of worker committees described the statement by the minister as "interference into internal affairs" of the STK which alone were empowered to take such decisions on paying their comrades.

In our view, we cannot help but take up the question of the nature of relations between the worker committees and the oblast trade union organizations. The extraordinary plenum of the oblast trade union council held in August assessed the situation as follows: "In the course of the strikes, certain leaders of the trade union organizations did not try to control the situation and stood on the sidelines of the workers' struggle for their rights. As a result, they lost authority and trust in their collectives" [8]. In this situation, the fact of the re-election and recognition of the work of the primary trade union organizations as unsatisfactory in the course of the developing report-election campaign was perceived as a completely natural process. The oblast trade union council made an attempt to establish as a counterweight to the worker committees rayon and city STK and hold their first conference, however there was no split in the worker movement, to the honor of the STK, and the conference was held not according to the trade union scenario [9].

The interests of the trade union and worker committees clashed sharply also in discussing the Law on Resolving Labor Disputes. Even by April 1989, the trade unions had drawn up an initial version, but as always were too



slow in resolving routine questions [10]. The miners' strike merely accelerated the preparation and adoption of the law.

The oblast council of worker committees reviewed the question of the attitude toward this document [7]. The deputy procurator of the oblast was invited to the session but with his aid the council members were unable to define precisely how to apply the document in specific situations and whether it was applicable at all to the strike and to the situation existing in the oblast. This is completely explainable since in the demands of the miners there were numerous points which could not be described as a labor dispute between the enterprise collective and the management, for example, the same demands about introducing regional cost accounting or halting the construction of the Krapivinskiy Hydropower Project.

Many points were proof of the conflict between the "center" and the region. It must be felt that for this reason the decision of the oblispolkom was not carried out to bring the status of the worker committees into conformity with the Law on the Procedure for Resolving Labor Disputes.

The strike movement in the oblast and the organizing of the new social formations in the course of its development are a rather unusual phenomenon and for this reason caused a significant diversity of opinions among the people. For example, let us examine the position of the working youth and the assessment of their actions by the members of the worker committees.

According to the data of the research conducted by the VTsIOM, this (verbal) position differed substantially from the opinions and assessments of persons over the age of 50. Among the young workers, there were 7-fold fewer who joined the strike under pressure, with 3 percent in comparison with 21 percent among those who were over 50 [5, p 11].

A poll of the regional council members to assess the degree of youth involvement both in the course of the strike and after it showed that they unanimously considered the working youth somewhat more radical in demands, but as a whole in terms of their activeness it was on the level of the basic portion of strikers. Nevertheless, precisely the youth was that portion of the workers which more sharply than the other age groups abandoned the struggle to realize the demands of the strikers. One of the reasons for this was that any organization which claims extended functioning undoubtedly should think about filling out its ranks with youth. During the first months activities of the worker committees in resolving routine, often urgent matters did not make it possible to pay proper attention to this question and the youth group among the workers which had not been very active even in the low-level worker committees, was somewhat alienated. Relatively recent events such as the holding of the Fourth Conference of Kuzbass Worker Committees on 18-19 November showed that a

significant portion of participants in the worker movement and its leaders had still not realized the need to win over the youth. For example, the proposal to incorporate a point on the attitude toward the youth and youth policy in the Bylaws of the Kuzbass Worker Union being adopted was turned down by a majority of the delegates. The speakers noted the sufficient formulation concerning collaboration with all public organizations, including the Komsomol. This point was simply removed from the voting. Thus, the members of the oblast worker committees at the given stage consciously excluded the working youth and their problems from their interests and most importantly the necessity of influencing it and collaborating with it through various (not only the Komsomol) organizations.

What has been set out is merely a small portion of the colossal work which must be done in order to study objectively and qualitatively all questions related to the rise of the worker movement in the new economic and sociopolitical situation arising in the oblast. The unsatisfactory fulfillment of the demands of the Protocol, the absence of any real changes for the better on the problems which have built up, the surviving red tape in examining questions in the ministries and departments—here are just several reasons among those which can become the grounds for a new wave of dissatisfaction, in our view, a more pernicious and unpredictable one in terms of scope and consequences. On the other hand, the social apathy and mistrust of their own forces apparent at times only among the youth, in spreading to other age groups, can lead ultimately not to less but possibly even greater harm to the attempts at social change.

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### **Persons Quitting (Expelled From) the Party: Quick Report**

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[Article by Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Orlova, science associate at the Center for Sociological Research under the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] In the course of research on public opinion concerning the party and the party worker,<sup>1</sup> over 3,000 persons were questioned and content analysis was made on 1,190 personal files of persons who quit (were expelled from) the ranks of the CPSU.

An examination of the personal files of persons who lived from Moscow to Khabarovsk and had been expelled from the party over 10 months of 1989 showed that 35 percent left the ranks of the CPSU at their own request and in the Baltic the figure was 80 percent, in Moscow 57 percent, Rostov-na-Donu 43 percent and Uzbekistan 16 percent. Over 2/3 of them had not had previous party reprimands.

Among those quitting the party there were almost 2.5-fold more men (73 percent) than women; a third of the persons were of pension age with 20-year membership in the party; 41 percent was 31-50 years of age; 21 percent was under 30. One-half of those expelled was workers at industrial enterprises; 14 percent was employed in the sphere of trade, consumer services and cooperatives; 22 percent was white collar personnel and IRS [engineer-technical worker], and 12 percent was leaders of varying (basically middle) level and 9 percent was agricultural workers. Some 62 percent of those quitting the CPSU had been in the party over 10 years. Among those questioned, 16 percent left the party without completing the candidate stage and of this number 27 percent were people from Baku, 25 percent were Muscovites, 15 percent was people of Khabarovsk, 14 percent and 11 percent inhabitants of Kiev and Syr-Darya Oblasts and 10 percent was inhabitants of Rostov-na-Donu. A portion of the respondents considered themselves unprepared to carry out the tasks confronting the communists in the period of perestroika and at the same time they commented that they supported the course of the renewal of society. Some did not want to join the ranks of the CPSU since "they had changed their views as to the role of the party since the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies."

A majority of the pensioner veterans of the party and labor had left the CPSU as they were frequently ill, they could not attend the party meetings, pay party dues on time and participate in the work of the party organizations to the degree demanded by the Bylaws. Many of the

pensioners who had quit were critical of their stay in the party: "I merely attended the meetings and did not carry out party assignments." Some, without having social assignments within their capacity, were vexed by the problem that they had nothing to do. In retiring on a pension, they did not feel concern or attention from the primary party organizations where they paid their dues. In our opinion, the honored old communists should be issued a special card with "Honored Party Member," and granted an opportunity to leave the party organization with dignity by being shifted to the respected veteran communists with the presentation of a chest insignia to them.

One of the reasons for leaving the party upon personal request, along with the state of health and family circumstances, is "disagreement with the party line." In 7 regions there were 9 percent such persons; including 40 percent in Vilnius, 11 percent each in Kiev Oblast and Khabarovsk, 7 percent in Rostov-na-Donu, 5 percent in Moscow, 3 percent in Uzbekistan and 1 percent in Azerbaijan. In their statements these persons wrote that they did not agree to the political line being carried out by the party and considered that it did not correspond to the basic principles of communist teachings and pointed out that their convictions had reached an irreconcilable contradiction with the CPSU Program and Bylaws. They considered themselves "honest party members of the period of stagnation" and the current state of affairs was incomprehensible to them. Also leaving the party were communists who moved to work in cooperatives. At a session in the Leninskiy Party Raykom of Moscow, the statements on quitting were justified by the fact that "there is no time to hold party meetings every month, with just formal reporting." At the same time, they were ready to pay a certain percentage of their income.

Some 46 percent of the respondents had been expelled for nonpayment of membership dues and loss of contact with the party organization, 7 percent due to the negative results of the candidate period, 4 percent for misdeeds involving drunkenness (with 10 percent each in Moscow and Khabarovsk and 1 percent in Vilnius).

### **Footnote**

1. The research was conducted in November 1989 in the RSFSR (Moscow, Rostov-na-Donu, Khabarovsk), Azerbaijan (Baku), the Baltic (Vilnius), Uzbekistan (Syr-Darya Oblast) and the Ukraine (Kiev Oblast).

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### **Articles Not Translated**

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